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SYNOPSIS 
This study investigates the hypothesis of a negative relationship between the level of disclosure 
and the cost of equity capital, for the top 100 companies on the South African JSE Securities 
Exchange for the period 1999 to 2003. 
Previous studies indicate the reason for this relationship is as a result of imbalances of 
information (information asymmetry) available to various parties, which can arise when a firm 
possesses certain valuable information that has not yet been publicly disclosed. This private 
information has however become known to a few select investors. The uninformed investor will 
therefore consequently demand a higher return to protect them against this information risk. The 
effect of information asymmetry can effect the cost of equity capital in the following two ways: 
(I) increasing disclosure, could result in an increase in the liquidity of a company's share and 
consequently a decrease in the premium demanded for the share, (2) increased disclosure reduces 
the information gap between a company's management and investors, thereby reducing the 
uncertainty in the market and in tum will reduce cost of equity capital. Both the above effects 
indicate that by increasing disclosure levels, the cost of equity capital could be reduced. 
In testing the above hypothesis this study adopts a direct method of testing, which involves 
estimating the cost of equity capital for each firm in the sample and determining the hypothesised 
relationship with the firm's respective disclosure level. Past studies have found that a firm's cost 
of equity capital is dependent on four main variables, namely beta, firm size, leverage and 
disclosure levels. Based on the prior findings the following independent variables have been 
included in the model tested: firstly, the systematic risk of a firm, which represents the risks 
specific to that particular firm. This is represented by the market beta of a firm. Secondly, the 
size of the firm indicated by the market capitalisation of the firm. The third variable is the level 
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of debt in the firm, which is indicated by the leverage of a firm. Lastly, the level of disclosure 
will influence the cost of equity capital and this is indicated by a ranked disclosure score. 
The hypothesised relationship is tested for the overall disclosure scores and for each individual 
disclosure category making up the overall disclosure score. To ensure the robustness of the 
findings the following sensitivity tests are also conducted: using alternative disclosure scores, 
fractional ranks for all variables, each year end tested separately, each company year end tested 
separately, each sector tested separately and different measure for the cost of equity capital. 
The hypothesised relationship showed no significant relationship for the overall disclosure score 
as well as for the four disclosure categories. Confirming this finding the sensitivity testing using 
the alternative disclosure scores, different company year ends, different industry sectors and the 
CAPM model for cost of equity capital also resulted in a statistically insignificant relationship. 
However, the results from the individual years in the sample resulted in an interesting result. For 
the early years a positive relationship was found, where as for the last two years a negative 
association was found 
The results from the study therefore indicate that there is a definite change in the hypothesised 
relationship in the South African market over the years examined in the sample. One reason for 
this could be due to the increase in focus on corporate governance disclosure which is now 
required by the JSE Securities exchange and the increase in focus on environmental disclosure. 
This could indicate that investors consider disclosure of a firm's corporate governance 
procedures and practices in assessing the risk levels of a firm. However, taking all the regression 
analysis results into account, the overall conclusion for this study is that there is no significant 
relationship, either positive or negative, between the cost of equity capital and the disclosure 
levels for the top 100 companies on the JSE for the five year time period analysed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
This study investigates the relationship between the level of financial disclosure and the cost of 
equity capital for the top 100 companies on the JSE Securities Exchange for the period 1999 to 
2003. Prior research of the relationship between a company's cost of capital and disclosure 
follows two distinct approaches. The first approach does not try and estimate the actual cost of 
capital, but indirectly tests the relationship between cost of capital and disclosure by using a 
proxy measure (such as bid-ask spreads, trade volume and share price volatility, probability of 
informed trade, beta and total risk of a firm) for the cost of capital. Indirect tests generally focus 
on the overall weighted average cost of capital being both the cost of equity and the cost of debt. 
The second approach, the direct method, estimates either the cost of equity or the cost of debt and 
then examines the relationship between these estimates and disclosure levels. This study applies 
the direct method and will estimate the cost of equity capital for companies in determining the 
relationship of the cost of equity capital with disclosure. 
Prior research indicates that there is a negative relationship between disclosure levels and the cost 
of capital. Information asymmetry is one of the main reasons for this relationship and can arise 
when a firm possesses certain valuable information that has not yet been publicly disclosed. This 
private information may however become known to a few select investors outside of the firm. 
The uninformed investor will consequently demand a higher return to protect them against this 
information risk. 
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Information asymmetry can affect the cost of capital in the following two ways: 
1. Information asymmetry among investors may be decreased by increasing disclosure, 
resulting in an increase in the liquidity of a company's share and a decrease in the 
premium demanded for the share. This increase in liquidity will cause transaction costs 
to decrease and the demand for the share to increase. This in tern will cause the cost of 
capital to decrease as found in studies by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991), Demsetz (1968), Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and 
Milgram (1985). 
2. Less disclosure will increase information asymmetry between a company's managers and 
investors and will in tum increase the estimation risk surrounding a firm as there is more 
uncertainty in the market. If this estimation risk, which relates to estimates of the firm's 
asset return and the payoff distribution, is not able to be diversified, investors will require 
a higher return to compensate them for this risk. Barry and Brawn (1984), Handa and 
Linn (1993) and Coles, Loewnstein and Suay (1995), Botosan (1997), Richardson and 
Welker (2001), Hail (2001) and Botosan and Plumlee (2002), all show that by increasing 
disclosure it will reduce the estimation risk and the return required leading to a decrease 
in the cost of capital. 
The relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure and the cost of equity capital will be 
investigated for the top 100 companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange for the period 1999 
to 2003. The cost of equity capital for each firm in the sample will be estimated and compared to 
the respective level of disclosure for each firm, thereby adopting the direct method of testing. 
The level of disclosure will be approximated by disclosure scores developed for the top 100 
companies on the JSE Securities Exchange (JSE) by the Ernst and Young Excellence in 
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Financial Reporting survey. This disclosure score is made up of four weighted components 
namely, performance review, financial disclosure, forward-looking information and presentation. 
A full explanation of the source for the disclosure scores and method of rating is discussed in 
section 3.3 of this study. The hypothesis that the cost of equity capital is negatively correlated to 
the level of disclosure is investigated for the overall weighted disclosure and individually for 
each of the individual four components namely, performance review, financial disclosure, 
forward-looking information and presentation. 
The cost of equity capital is estimated by using the residual income model as developed by 
Edwards and Bell (1961), Ohlsen (1995) and Feltham and Ohlsen (1995). The model estimates 
the intrinsic value of the firm, which is defined as the book value of equity plus the present value 
of future residual income. The implied cost of equity capital is the rate that equates the intrinsic 
value of the firm to the current market price of the share. The cost of equity capital is the rate 
that investors discount future expected residual income to arrive at the current market price for a 
share. Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee (2000), Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2000), 
Richardson and Welker (2001) and Hail (2001) have all used this approach in determining the 
relationship between the cost of equity capital and the level of disclosure. This approach was 
adopted as it has the least amount of estimation errors. The CAPM is also used to estimate the 
cost of equity capital to test the robustness of the result achieved using the residual income 
model. 
To test the hypothesis of a negative relationship between the level of financial disclosure and the 
cost of equity capital (COE), COE is regressed against beta, market value, leverage and the 
disclosure scores, which have been shown to represent a significant relationship with COE. Beta 
measures the market risk of a company (Bodie, Kane and Marcus, 1999) and therefore as beta 
increases, the risk of a firm will increase resulting in an increase in COE. Financial leverage is 
included in the model as a measure of risk and therefore as leverage increases it is expected that 
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the cost of equity capital would increase. However beta and leverage may also be correlated with 
each other. Therefore when performing the multiple regression analysis an adjustment will be 
made to take into account this multicollinearity. As the size of a firm increases, as indicated by 
market value, more information is made available reducing the risk of a firm resulting in a 
decrease in COE (Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan, 200 I). The sample of this study consists of 
the top 100 companies on the JSE Securities Exchange. Even though the sample only consists of 
the largest 100 companies there is still merit in firm size as an independent variable as there is a 
large variation in size of companies in the sample. 
1.2. MOTIVATION FOR RESEARCH 
This research will investigate whether increased levels of disclosure will decrease the associated 
potential risk that an investor faces if he/she had to invest in a particular company which would 
result in a decrease of the company's cost of capital. 
1.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary objectives of this investigation are to determine whether: 
• There is a negative association between the quality of disclosure and the cost of equity 
capital; and 
• There is a negative association between each of the four components of the overall 
disclosure score and the cost of equity capital. 
The disclosure scores and the estimates for the cost of equity capital will also be tested to 
determine if they exhibit expected relationships with various independent variables. 
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In order to test the robustness of the findings of the primary objectives, the model developed will 
be analysed to determine if the findings are consistent: 
• for all years in the sample as the relationship may have changed over the years 
• across all firm year ends. The expected relationship may differ depending on the year end 
of the company. 
• across all industry sectors. Some industries may experience a greater impact of increased 
disclosure. 
• for other measures of the cost of equity capital. 
• for different transformations of the disclosure scores. 
1.4. LIMITATIONS 
The following limitations may affect the results of the study: 
• The study has been limited to the largest 100 companies on the JSE Securities Exchange 
and therefore there is selection bias and may not be representative of the South African 
market as a whole. 
• A few large South African companies are not listed on the JSE Securities exchange and 
therefore the impact of these companies on the study can not be assessed. 
• The study was performed for the years 1999 to 2003. As the introduction of King II and 
the harmonisation of the accounting standards to International Financial Reporting 
Standards only occurred from 2002 onwards, the effect of improved disclosure may not 
be fully reflected in this study. 
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1.5. ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions have been made in the study: 
• Disclosure levels as indicated by the annual financial statements are representative of the 
overall disclosure level in the market. Lang and Lundholm (1993) show that annual 
financial statement disclosure is positively correlated with the amount of disclosure 
provided via other sources. Therefore the annual financial statements may be used as a 
proxy for the overall disclosure level for a firm. 
• The market capitalisation of a company is an indication of company size. 
• Share prices and returns follow a random walk, which implies that share returns are 
normally distributed. 
• No selection bias is created by the exclusion of companies from the sample, due to 
incomplete data, as their cost of equity capital is assumed to equal the average of the 
sample. 
1.6. STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
The introduction is followed by a literature review (Chapter 2), which summanses prevIOus 
studies relevant to the topic. Thereafter, the methodology used in analysing the data is described 
(Chapter 3). A discussion and analysis of the findings of the research follows the methodology 
(Chapter 4). Finally, conclusions and implications regarding the findings are discussed in 
relation to the research objectives (Chapter 5). 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previous theoretical and empirical research in the field of cost of capital and corporate disclosure 
is extensive. Therefore in trying to gain an understanding of the relationship between disclosure 
and the cost of equity capital this literature review will first explore the role of disclosure in 
capital markets, the South African disclosure environment and an understanding of the various 
streams of disclosure literature. 
Once a general understanding of the above topics has been achieved the literature review will 
focus on the various streams of disclosure studies. Firstly, the difference between private and 
public infonnation is explained. The literature review then explores the various studies of public 
information which include positive accounting theory and voluntary disclosure leading to an 
increased number of analysts of the firm, improved liquidity and lastly reduced cost of capital. 
The literature review then investigates in greater detail into the theoretical and empirical studies 
of the effect of disclosure levels on the cost of capital. These studies follow two distinct methods 
of testing namely indirect, where by proxies are sued for the cost of capital and the direct method 
where the cost of capital is estimated. 
Firstly, the importance and relevance of the concept of cost of equity capital is explained 
followed by the role of disclosure in capital markets and the underlying factors resulting in the 
demand for disclosure. The disclosure environment in which a company operates may determine 
the quality and extent of disclosure; therefore the South African disclosure environment is 
described. The remainder of the literature review will focus on theoretical and empirical studies 
that have been performed in the area of disclosure of financial infonnation and the relationship 
between financial disclosure and the cost of capital. 
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('~ ... 1. A '_:n~ .. V .. :'/n .. nn 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
2.1. THE ROLE OF DISCLOSURE IN CAPITAL MARKETS 
Disclosure is provided by firms in many ways, for example: annual financial statements, 
management discussion and analysis, and other regulatory filings. In addition to the mandatory 
disclosure that firms have to provide, some firms undertake to supply voluntary disclosure. This 
voluntary disclosure can take the form of management forecasts, analyst presentations, press 
releases, internet sites and other corporate disclosure. Lastly, there is disclosure about the firm 
by intermediaries, such as financial analysts, industry experts and the financial press (Healy and 
Palepu, 200 I). 
Healy and Palepu (200 I) argue that the demand for disclosure in capital markets is due to two 
factors namely the level of information asymmetry in the market and the agency problem 
between managers and investors. Firstly, information asymmetry arises when there is a 
mismatch of information between management and investors. Management has certain 
information that it has not yet made known to investors and therefore has superior knowledge. 
There are two possible solutions to this problem. The first solution is the implementation of 
regulation that requires managers to fully disclosure all private information. The second solution 
is that information intermediaries can engage in private information production which will 
provide them with extra information, which will enable them to reveal new information that will 
decrease management's level of superior information. Both of these solutions will result in 
increased disclosure. 
Secondly, information asymmetry is caused by the agency problem. The agency problem arises 
because investors do not play an active role in the running of the business and delegate this role 
to management. The agency problem arises when there is a contlict of interests between the 
shareholders and management. This may result in management making decisions that benefit 
them more than the investors. Healy and Palepu (200 I) suggest three solutions to this problem. 
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Firstly, contracts can be drawn up between the investors and management that align the interest 
of both parties. These contracts should require management to disclose relevant information so 
that investors can monitor management's performance. Secondly, a board of directors can be set 
up to represent the investors. This will ensure that investor's interests will be taken into account 
in the management of the company. Finally, information intermediaries produce private 
information that will highlight any misuse of funds by management. As with information 
asymmetry all three of these solutions should result in more disclosure being made available. 
The above study therefore shows that disclosure levels will be increased to decrease the risk 
facing investors. 
2.2. REGULATION OF DISCLOSURE AND FINANCIAL REPORTING 
To fully understand the reporting environment In South Africa an understanding of the 
regulations and standards governing disclosure is required. The extent and nature of disclosure is 
determined by South African Statements of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP), 
the Company's Act, JSE Listing Requirements and various voluntary disclosure 
recommendations. 
The South African Statements of GAAP represent the generally accepted accounting treatment of 
transactions and have been harmonised with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (lASB). This has been done in 
accordance with circular 5/2003 issued by The South African Institute of Chartered Accountants. 
A process has been implemented to align the text of South African GAAP statements as a result 
of the IASB's improvements project. Statements of GAAP which will not be revised will be re-
issued to align their text with IFRS. Therefore in the future the South African statements of 
GAAP will be identical to IFRS. 
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There are many regulations that regulate corporate reporting and disclosure. In South African the 
Companies Act governs all companies incorporated in South Africa. The Act contains various 
disclosure requirements and Schedule 4 to the Act prescribes certain minimum disclosure items. 
The Companies Act 61 of 1973 states that "the annual financial statements of a company shall, in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting practice, fairly present the state of affairs of the 
company and its business as at the end of the financial year concerned and the profit or loss of 
the company for that financial year and shall for that purpose be in accordance with and include 
at least the matters prescribed by Schedule 4, in so far as they are applicable, and comply with 
any other requirement of this Act." This section of the Act therefore only requires a company to 
comply with generally accepted accounting practice and not the Statements of GAAP. 
In contrast to this, in terms of Paragraph 5 of Schedule 4 of the Act '"if it appears to the directors 
of a company that there are reasons for departing from any of the accounting concepts stated in 
Statements of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice approved by the Accounting practices 
Board, where such appropriate Statements exist, in preparing the company's financial statements 
in respect of any accounting period they may do so, but particulars of the departure, the effects 
and the reason for it shall be given ". 
There is therefore some confusion as to whether companIes needed to comply with either 
generally accepted accounting practice or Statements of GAAP. A legal opinion was obtained by 
SAICA in September 1999 which concluded in Circular 8/99 that in order to comply with the 
Companies Act, the financial statements are to be prepared in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting practice. However, if this materially departs from Statements of GAAP, disclosure 
should be made of the effect of the departure. 
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In addition to the Companies Act, companies who are listed on the JSE Securities Exchange 
(JSE) are required to comply with certain minimum listing requirements that include disclosures 
that have to be made. Paragraphs 8.57 to 8.61 of the Listing Requirements detail the minimum 
contents of interim, provisional and abridged reports, whilst paragraphs 8.62 to 8.64 deal with 
annual financial statements. The revised Listing Requirements will require companies to comply 
with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for financial periods commencing on or 
after 1 January 2005. 
To date there has been no legal backing for the Generally Accepted Accounting Standards 
(GAAP) in South Africa; however significant developments have been made in developing 
legislation. The most significant development is the draft Financial Reporting Bill, an initiative 
of the Ministry of Finance to improve the quality of financial reporting. The draft bill proposes 
legal backing for GAAP, the establishment by the Financial Services Board of an investigative 
committee and an enforcement committee and the development of limited purpose financial 
reporting standards to be used by certain small and medium sized entities. 
In conjunction with the Statements of GAAP and the regulatory requirements there are certain 
guidelines on voluntary disclosure which detail best practice in terms of corporate governance, 
stakeholder communication and social disclosure. The South African corporate governance 
standard is the King II Report, which details best practice for corporate governance practices and 
disclosures in the annual financial statements relating to corporate governance. King II applies to 
all companies listed on the JSE Securities exchange, however all companies are recommended to 
apply King II principles. King II focuses on the following main categories for which disclosure 
is required: boards and directors, audit and auditing internal audit, risk management, non-
financial matters, relations with shareholders, communication and code of ethics. 
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The South African Institute of Chartered Accountants issued guidance on Stakeholder 
Communication in the Annual Report in response to the requirements of the King Report to 
disclose material matters of significant interest and concern to all stakeholders. The guide covers 
the following general areas: risks and uncertainties for the company, financial results and 
returns, accounting policies and areas of judgement, capital structure, future investments, 
employment policies and environmental and social responsibility. 
All of the above disclosure requirements are taken into account determining the disclosure scores 
developed by the Ernst & Young Excellence in Financial Reporting survey. 
2.3. DISCLOSURE LITERATURE 
Previous disclosure literature is very diverse and covers a large variety of research areas. The 
following diagram summarises the various streams of research: 
Private Information 
Indirect Testing 
Cost of Equity Cost of Debt Cost of Capital 
Diagram 1: Disclosure Literature - streams of research 
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As Diagram 1 illustrates, information regarding a firm can either be private information or 
information which is publicly available. Following this, research around publicly available 
information follows two research streams. One being positive accounting theory and the other 
voluntary disclosure literature. Within the voluntary disclosure literature there are three major 
areas of research, these investigate the level of voluntary disclosure against; improved liquidity, 
increased number of analysts following the firm and reduced cost of capital. 
The research into cost of capital and disclosure of information also follows two distinct streams 
of research. Firstly, indirect testing looks at the relationship between cost of capital and 
disclosure. These studies are indirect as they use proxy measures (e.g. bid-ask spreads, trade 
volume and share price volatility, beta and total firm risk) for the cost of capital and do not try 
and estimate the actual cost of capital. It must be noted that indirect testing focuses on the 
overall cost of capital being both the cost of equity and the cost of debt. The second stream of 
research is direct testing. Direct testing tries to estimate either the cost of equity or the cost of 
debt and then examines the relationship between these estimates and disclosure. 
This study will focus on voluntary disclosed public information that has the effect of reducing the 
cost of capital. The study will follow the direct testing approach to the relationship between cost 
of equity capital and disclosure. (This is illustrated on the Diagram 1 by the solid line and the 
shaded boxes.) 
2.4. PRIV A TE AND PUBLIC INFORMATION 
Information available about a firm consists of both private and public information. Prior research 
has investigated both private and public information affects and these are discussed below. 
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2.4.1. Private Information 
The first stream of research investigates the effect of private information. Admati (1985) 
analysed the effects of private information in a multi-asset model. Her study examined how an 
asset's equilibrium price is affected by information on its own fundamentals and other assets. 
Admati (1985) finds that each investor has a different risk-return trade-off. Easley and O'Hara 
(2002) confirm the finding of Admati (1985) and state that informed and uninformed investors 
hold different portfolios. 
Wang (1991) used a two-asset multi-period model to show that private information results in two 
effects on asset prices. First, uninformed investors require a premium to compensate them as the 
do not have as much information available as informed investors. Second, when informed 
investors trade this makes prices more informative as more private information will be captured 
in the price. This will in turn reduce the risk facing uninformed investors and therefore will also 
reduce the premium required. 
All the above studies therefore show that if there is private information in the market a premium 
will be required for the company's equity as there is increased risk. No premium will be required 
if the market is strong form efficient as all information of every kind will then be reflected in the 
share price. Evidence has indicated that the South African market is not strong form efficient 
(Thompson and Ward, 1995) and therefore a premium will be required for private information. 
2.4.2. Public Information 
When information is disclosed it turns private information into public information. Therefore 
this stream of research looks at the role of public information in affecting the asset prices. This 
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therefore assumes that the market is semi-strong efficient as all public information is reflected in 
the share price. There is evidence that the South African market is semi-strong form efficient 
(Thompson and Ward 1995). The next section expands the research into public information. 
2.5. REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC 
INFORMATION ON CAPITAL MARKETS 
Capital market consequences of disclosure have been examined by both positive accounting 
theory and voluntary disclosure literatures. Positive accounting theory has focused on the effect 
that changes to the accounting methods and standards have on the capital markets. On the other 
hand voluntary disclosure studies have looked at capital market consequences of a change in 
disclosure and a change in the level of disclosure. 
2.5.1. Positive accounting theory 
Positive accounting theory studies investigate the effect of a change in accounting policy or 
accounting option that has been taken. These studies are explored below. 
Dyckman and Smith (1979) and Collins, Rozeff and Dhaliwal (1981) find that oil and gas firms 
that have to change their policy for pre-production costs show a decline in their share price. 
Contradictory to this finding, Leftwich (1981) examined other accounting standard changes and 
finds no significant change in share prices. Similarly, studies of firm's accounting policy 
changes find no significant relationship between share returns at the announcement date of the 
accounting method change and contracting and political factors (Holthausen, 1981). 
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There are two possible reasons for the above findings. Firstly, accounting decisions can be seen 
to have no significant shareholder wealth effects. Therefore the shareholder will not gain from 
the change in accounting method as this only changes the reported earning and adds no intrinsic 
value to the firm. A second reason is that it may be difficult to measure the share price effects. 
An example of this is that accounting standards are set over a period of time and therefore it is 
difficult to capture the effects at the date the announcement is made. (Healy and Papelu, 2001) 
Easley and O'Hara (2002) however show that there is an important role for the accuracy of 
information in asset pricing. Greater precision will directly lower a firms cost of capital as it will 
reduce the riskiness of a firm. This finding is consistent with other accounting research which 
looks at the effect of accounting treatments on share prices. 
Gietzmann and Trombetta (2000) consider how changes in accounting policy interact with the 
subsequent choice of voluntary disclosure. They conclude that there is no simple substitution 
between various communication channels that a firm may use. When firms change to a different 
accounting policy, either voluntarily or by regulation, they can not influence the impact the 
change in accounting policy by increasing the level of voluntary disclosure. 
2.5.2. Voluntary disclosure literature 
The studies around voluntary disclosure show that there are three capital market effects of 
increased voluntary disclosure. Namely, improved liquidity of the firm's shares, an increased 
number of analysts following the firm and a reduction in the firm's cost of capital (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). 
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2.5.2.1. Improved Liquidity 
Both Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and Kim and Verrecchia (1994) hypothesised and found 
that increased voluntary disclosure would reduce any information asymmetries between investors 
and in turn would increase confidence levels in that share and consequently the share's liquidity 
would increase. 
Following on from the previous research Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) found that firms with 
increased disclosure experience an increase in their share price that is not related to current 
performance. Gelb and Zarowin's (2000) study shows that firms with high disclosure ratings 
have high share price associations with current and future earnings, relative to firms with low 
disclosure ratings. Both these studies show that disclosure strategies affect the speed at which 
information is reflected in share prices. 
Contradicting the above findings Ohlsen (1979) shows that the quality, extent or volume of 
information that is disclosed in the annual reports has no effect on stock prices and risk. A 
similar result is found by Garsombke (1976). In South Africa Nagash (1990, 1995) supported the 
observation that the quality or extent of disclosure has no effect on the share price or risk. 
Further studies attempted to measure share liquidity and the relationship between liquidity and 
disclosure. Welker (1995) finds a significant negative association between disclosure ratings and 
bid-ask spreads, the measure used for liquidity. However, Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) 
document that firms that had increased disclosure ratings had higher bid-ask spreads than their 
peers. But after the disclosure increase their bid-ask spreads reverted back to the level of their 
peers. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) confirm the finding by Welker (1995) and also find that 
firm's with higher levels of disclosure have lower bid-ask spreads. 
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The above studies therefore indicate that increased disclosure levels lower bid-ask spreads, which 
will increases the liquidity of a firm's share. 
2.5.2.2. Increased number of analysts 
Bushan (1989 a, b) and Lang and Lundholm (1996) argue that if management's private 
information will not be fully reflected in required disclosure, voluntary disclosure will reduce that 
cost of information for analysts and therefore increase the number of analysts. However the 
effect of increased disclosure on the demand for analysts is ambiguous. As firstly, increased 
disclosure enables an analyst to create valuable new information that was not possible before and 
therefore there would be an increase in demand for analysts. On the other hand increased 
voluntary disclosure provides the public with some information regarding management's private 
information. This is what the analysts would normally do and therefore this may cause a decline 
in demand for analysts (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Supporting the first effect above Land and Lundholm (1993) show that firms that have higher 
disclosure experience a larger analyst following, less variation in analyst forecasts and less 
volatility in forecast revisions. Francis, Hanna and Philbrick (1998) also find that there is an 
increase in analyst following for firms who make conference calls to analysts thereby increasing 
the level of information available. 
2.5.2.3. Reduced cost of capital 
There are many studies on the effect of disclosure on cost of capital. These will be fully 
discussed in the following section. 
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2.6. DISCLOSURE EFFECTS ON THE COST OF CAPITAL 
A firm will benefit when increased disclosure will result in a lower cost of capital. Cost of 
capital is the required rate of return for investors and represents the required rate of return for any 
project to add value to the firm. Inadequate and incomplete information may be reflected in the 
cost of capital as a premium above the risk-free rate of return. The minimum cost of capital is the 
risk-free rate of return plus the premium for economic risk (Elliot and Jacobson, 1994). One of 
the proposed benefits of improved disclosure is the decrease in uncertainty regarding the future of 
the company (Hirsh leifer, 1971; Nagash, 1995). By decreasing uncertainty, the risk of a firm will 
be decreased and therefore should result in a decrease in the cost of capital. 
There are two streams of research that support the hypothesis of a negative association between 
the level of disclosure and the cost of capital. Diagram 2 is a schematic diagram of the two main 
ways in which disclosure can reduce the cost of capital. 
I 
Enhanced Public Disclosure 
I 
I 
I I 
Reduced information asymmetry Reduced information asymmetry 
between managers and investors amoung investors 
I 
I I 
I 
Reduced estimation risk Increased market liquidity 
I I 
Reduced Cost of Capital 
Diagram 2: The effect of increased disclosure on Cost of Capital 
(Botosan, 2000 p61) 
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Firstly, increased disclosure by a firm will result in greater liquidity of a firm's share as it reduces 
the information asymmetry among investors. Information asymmetry exists when there is an 
imbalance between the nature and extent of information available to two different parties. The 
greater liquidity will then cause transaction costs to decrease and the demand for the share to 
increase. Both these factors combined will cause the cost of capital to decrease (Botosan, 1997; 
Richardson and Welker, 2001; Hail, 2001; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). For example Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986) show that the cost of capital is greater for firms that have larger bid-ask 
spreads, which results in decreased liquidity, as investors require a higher return for the increased 
transaction costs. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) find that greater disclosure reduces the 
information made known by a large trade. This will cause less of a price effect and in turn 
investors are willing to take on larger positions in the share and therefore demand for the share 
will increase and reduce the cost of capital. 
The second stream of research hypotheses that increased disclosure will reduce the estimation 
risk surrounding a firm as the information asymmetry between managers and investors will be 
reduced. This estimation risk relates to estimates of the firm's asset return and the payoff 
distribution. When there is little information about a particular firm the uncertainty around that 
firm is greater. The more uncertainty there is, the greater the estimation risk is going to be. If 
this estimation risk cannot be diversified investors will require a higher return to compensate 
them for this risk thereby leading to an increased cost of capital. 
Barry and Brown (1984), Handa and Linn (1993) and Coles, Loewnstein and Suay (1995) 
conclude that estimation risk cannot be diversified. Therefore increasing disclosure will increase 
the amount of information available about the firm, which will result in a lower estimation risk 
and therefore investors will require a lower premium for this risk. As a lower premium is 
required it will result in a lower cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Richardson and Welker, 2001; 
Hail, 2001; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). 
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Both arguments of the negative relationship between disclosure and cost of capital depend on the 
reduction of information asymmetry. The relationship between information asymmetry and the 
cost of capital is discussed below. 
2.6.1. Information asymmetry and the cost of capital 
Information asymmetry can arise when a firm possesses certain value relevant information that 
has not yet been publicly disclosed. This private information may become known to a few select 
investors, which will create an adverse selection problem as uninformed investors face an 
information risk. This will continue until this information is publicly disclosed or it is 
incorporated in the price through informed trading. Since the profits of informed investors equals 
the losses of uninformed investors (Kyle, 1985), uninformed investors will demand a higher 
return to protect themselves against this information risk. Therefore information asymmetry is 
thought to encourage unwillingness to trade and increase the cost of capital as investors price-
protect them against any loss from trading with less information than other informed investors 
(Bhattacharya and Spiegel, 1991; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). 
Increasing the level of disclosure, reduces the possibility of information asymmetry occurring 
between the firm and its shareholders or between buyers and sellers of the share as more 
information is made available to uninformed investors. This will cause the discount at which the 
shares are issued to decrease, resulting in a lower cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; 
Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996). Supporting this finding Brown, Finn and Hillegeist (2001) 
found that higher quality disclosure reduces any uncertainties and increases investors confidence, 
this will lead to a lower level of information asymmetry and therefore a lower cost of capital. 
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Easly and O'Hara (2002) suggest that differences in the composition of information between 
public and private information will affect the cost of capital. Investors will require a higher 
return for firms that have a larger percentage of private information. This reflects the fact that 
private information increases the risk to uninformed investors because informed investors are 
better able to shift their portfolios to incorporate new information. The greater amount there is of 
private information, the greater the level of information asymmetry there is. Greater disclosure 
increases the quality of public information available, and this in turn leads to a convergence of 
expectations between market participants. This therefore decreases the level of information 
asymmetry in the market. 
Diamond and Verrecchia's (1991) study shows that by revealing public information to reduce 
information asymmetry one can reduce a firm's cost of capital by increasing the demand from 
large investors due to the increased liquidity of the firm's shares. This finding is supported by 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2001) who find that that there is a positive association between information risk and returns. 
Therefore if a firm can reduce its amount of information asymmetry by improving its disclosure 
practices, the empirical evidence indicates that it will reduce its cost of equity. 
2.6.2. Arguments against disclosure effects 
The following arguments have been made against disclosure effects. 
Managers have incentives to minimise the volatility of share price movements by controlling the 
flow of information to eliminate fluctuations in earnings and mislead shareholders with respect to 
the relative riskiness of the firm. If managers had to manipulate or not publish certain adverse 
information, subsequent disclosure of this information might result in lower market prices and a 
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higher cost of equity capital. Likewise if managers try to avoid or manipulate disclosure to make 
the firm seem less risky to investors, subsequent disclosure might result in higher risk than 
perceived by investors. This increase in perceived risk will cause an increase in the cost of equity 
capital of the firm (Dhaliwal, 1979). 
Given that there are conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders, management 
disclosures may not be viewed as credible to shareholders. Managers also argue that increased 
disclosure actually reduces shareholder value by revealing valuable information about the firm to 
competitors or by increasing legal costs for the firm (Verrecchia, 1983, 1990; Darrough and 
Stoughton, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990; Gigler, 1994; Newman and Sansing, 1993; Franscis, 
Philbrick and Schipper, 1994; Skinner, 1994; Healy and Palepu, 1995). 
Even though the above arguments have been made against a negative relationship between 
disclosure levels and the cost of equity capital, there is stronger evidence that the relationship 
exists. 
2.6.3. Research of disclosure effects 
The research into the disclosure effects on the cost of capital has followed two distinct 
approaches. Firstly, the indirect approach looks at the impact of disclosure on variables that are 
positively correlated with the cost of capital. Early studies used beta and total risk as proxies for 
the cost of capital. More recent studies have used the relationship to information asymmetry to 
examine disclosure effects. These studies examine the association between proxies for 
information asymmetry and disclosure levels. The indirect approach looks at the overall cost of 
capital (i.e. cost of equity and debt). 
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Secondly, the direct approach explicitly looks at either the cost of equity capital or the cost of 
debt, which together make up the overall cost of capital. The direct approach attempts to make 
estimates of either the cost of equity capital or the cost of debt and then compares these estimates 
to the level of disclosure. 
2.7. INDIRECT TESTING 
As mentioned above indirect testing looks at the association between proxies of information 
asymmetry of the cost of capital and the disclosure levels. The proxies for cost of capital that 
have been used in prior studies are bid-ask spreads, trading volume and share price volatility, 
probability of informed trade (PIN) and beta and total risk of a firm. For each of these four 
proxies it has been shown that there is a relationship between the proxy and the disclosure policy 
ofa firm (Core, 2001). 
2.7.1. Bid-ask spreads 
The first proxy, the bid-ask spread, is thought to measure information asymmetry explicitly. The 
reason for this is that the bid-ask spread addresses the adverse selection problem between buyers 
and sellers. Less information asymmetry implies less adverse selection, which in turn will result 
in a lower bid-ask spread (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). Bid-ask spreads, which are a measure for 
market liquidity, are predicted to be inversely related to disclosure policy. Increased trading by 
informed investors and a higher probability of an information event occurring are both thought to 
decrease spreads and strengthen the relationship between spreads and disclosure (Welker, 1995). 
Disclosure policy influences market liquidity as uninformed investors price protect them against 
adverse selection, and this price protection is manifested in the liquidity of the market. 
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Welker (1995) investigates the association between disclosure quality and the closing relative 
bid-ask spreads. According to Welker (1995) spreads compensate market makers for the 
following type of costs: (1) adverse selection costs that reflect information asymmetry, (2) 
inventory costs that result from holding a non-optimal diversified portfolio, (3) order processing 
costs. Welker's results show that there is a negative relationship between higher overall 
disclosure scores and relative spreads, even after controlling for return volatility, trading volume 
and share price. Welker's (1995) study shows that the relative bid-ask spread for firms in the 
bottom third of the rankings are approximately 50 percent higher than firms with rankings in the 
top third. 
Confirming Welker's (1995) results Healy et al. (1999) also find that better disclosure is 
associated with smaller bid-ask spreads. Similarly, Coller and Yohn (1997) show that increased 
disclosure of management forecasts reduce bid-ask spreads. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and 
Bloomfied and Wilks (2000) also suggest that improvements in liquidity will also increase prices 
because investors demand less of a premium to cover the likely cost of closing out their positions 
in the future. 
All the above studies investigated the once-off improvement in disclosure levels. Building on 
this Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) use a time-series approach to investigate whether firms that 
have sustained improvements in disclosure, as shown by disclosure ratings, improved stock 
performance and capital market intermediation. The capital market intermediation is shown by 
increased stock liquidity, institutional interest and analyst following. 
Their findings showed that firms show a significant increase in share performance in the year of 
the disclosure increase and the following year. Their study also showed that increased disclosure 
is related to improved liquidity, growth in institutional ownership and analyst coverage. 
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The above studies reveal that majority of studies using the bid-ask spread as a proxy for the cost 
of capital found that there is a negative relationship between the level of disclosure and the bid-
ask spreads and consequently a negative relationship between the level of disclosure and the cost 
of capital. 
2.7.2. Trade volume and share price volatility 
Two further proxies for information asymmetry are trading volumes and share price volatility. 
Trading volume is a measure of liquidity in that it captures the willingness of some investors to 
sell the shares that they hold and willingness of other investors to buy shares. This willingness to 
buy and sell shares should be inversely related to the level of information asymmetry. 
Share price volatility has been used in prior studies as a proxy for information asymmetry (Lang 
and Lundholm, 1993). Low volatility in share prices suggests that there is a very low level of 
information asymmetry between the firm and shareholders and between investors. It must also 
be noted that volatility is also affected by many other factors. Bushee and Noe (2000) show that 
the effect of disclosure on volatility is complex and may depend on the type of investor attracted 
to the firm. Due to the above mentioned reasons one would expect that volatility as a measure of 
information asymmetry would likely be the weakest measure (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) examine both these measures of information asymmetry and find 
that firms who switched to lFRS or US GAAP from German GAAP experience a significant 
increase in share volume. However they were unable to find a negative association between 
share price volatility and increases in disclosure. 
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2.7.3. Probability of Informed Trade (PIN) 
The third proxy for information asymmetry is the Probability of Informed Trade (PIN) measure. 
PIN measures the probability that a trade was initiated by an investor who has obtained private 
information about the value of a firm. The advantage of using the PIN measure is that it is a 
direct measure of information asymmetry, whereas using spread-based measures for information 
asymmetry is an indirect measure and the results are difficult to interpret. Lee, Mucklow and 
Ready (1994) show that when developing a proxy for information asymmetry, one must account 
for both spreads and market depths, since market makers will manipulate both to protect 
themselves against information asymmetry. This is shown in the study by Heflin, Shaw and Wild 
(2001) who used both spreads and depths as proxies for information asymmetry. Their results 
show that disclosure scores are negatively associated with effective spreads; however they are 
negatively associated with depths as well. This is contradictory as one would expect depths to 
decrease with the level of information asymmetry and increase with the level of disclosure. 
Therefore resulting in a positive relationship not a negative one. 
Brown, Finn and Hillegeist (2001) examine the relationship between disclosure quality and PIN 
measure as a proxy for information asymmetry. Their results show that overall disclosure 
quality, as measured by the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR), is 
negatively associated with the level of information asymmetry. 
Brown, Finn and Hillegeist's (2001) study focuses on the relationship between overall disclosure 
score and the three components that make it up namely: annual report, quarterly report and 
investor relations. However their result for the three category scores differs from that of Botosan 
and Plumlee (2000). Their results show that there is significantly negative association between 
PIN and investor relations but no other significant associations are found for annual report or 
quarterly report. 
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A similar result is found by Easley, Hvidkjaer and O'Hara (2000) who found that firms with 
greater information asymmetry earn higher returns after controlling for Beta, Size and Book-to-
Market ratios. 
Previous research therefore suggests that higher levels of information asymmetry, approximated 
by the PIN measure, could result in a higher cost of capital for firms. 
2.7.4. Beta and Total Risk of a Firm 
Earlier indirect studies used the proxy measures of beta and total risk of a firm, as measured by 
the standard deviation of a firm's return, for the cost of capital. 
Dhal iwal (1979) investigates the impact of disclosure regulations that required segmental 
disclosures on a firm's cost of capital. His study assumed that the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) had validity in the market. The proxies were firstly beta, which is the systematic risk of 
the firm. CAPM is defined as the risk-free rate plus beta times by the market risk premium 
(Ross, Westfield, Jordan and Firer, 1996). The risk-free rate and the market risk premium 
remains constant across all firms in the market. Therefore the only variable that can influence a 
firm's cost of equity capital would be beta. 
Secondly, the standard deviation of the firm's returns is used as another proxy. The total risk 
relating to a firm is made up of two parts: (1) firm specific risk or unsystematic risk and (2) 
market risk or systematic risk. In a diversified portfolio unsystematic risk is diversified away and 
therefore would not affect cost of equity capital. However it has been shown that investors tend 
to on average under-diversify (Bierman, 1974). This suggests that the firms own standard 
deviation is a relevant risk measure as not all the unsystematic risk can be diversified away and 
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therefore will affect the cost of equity capital. This view is supported by Arditti (1967) and 
Haley (1972) who find that realised returns are related to their own standard deviations. 
Dhaliwal's study (1979) shows that disclosure regulation significantly decreased the cost of 
equity capital as proxied by the standard deviation of the firm's returns. The relationship with 
beta also results in a decrease in the cost of equity capital; however the effect was much weaker. 
Dhaliwal, Spicer and Vickery (1979) examine the relationship between increased disclosure on 
the cost of equity capital. The specific increase in disclosure was the SEC's requirement that 
segmental disclosure be given. This study uses the same surrogates for cost of equity capital as 
Dhaliwal (1979). Dhaliwal, Spicer and Vickery find that increased disclosure, measured by 
producing segmental disclosure, reduced the cost of equity capital. They however cautioned their 
results as the tests were only done using two surrogates for the cost of equity capital and the 
assumption was made that security returns follow a normal distribution. 
In conclusion, early studies using beta and standard deviation of returns as proxies for the cost of 
capital showed a negative relationship between the cost of capital and the level of financial 
disclosure. 
2.7.5. South African evidence of a negative association between the level of disclosure and 
the Cost of Capital 
Negash (200 I) examines whether uncertainty that arises from information asymmetry can be 
measured by stock price volatility and the beta coefficient. More specifically Negash (2001) tests 
whether firms that release more information through the annual financial report, which results in 
lower information asymmetry, will have a lower adverse selection component of their bid ask 
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spread. His study only looked at companies in the industrial sector for the years 1993-1995. 
This study could not establish whether disclosure was is an increasing or decreasing function of 
uncertainty, represented by the bid-ask spread. However Negash (200 I) states that even though 
the nature of the relationship could not be established, there is definitely an association between 
the two. Therefore in South Africa there is no conclusive evidence that increased disclosure will 
reduce a company's cost of capital. 
2.8. DIRECT TESTING 
Direct testing investigates the relationship between disclosure levels and the cost of equity capital 
and the cost of debt individually. Research in this area attempts to estimate a value for either the 
cost of equity capital or the cost of debt and then determine the relationship between these 
estimates and the level of disclosure. 
2.8.1. Cost of Debt 
Sengupta (1998) examines the association between a firm's overall disclosure quality and the 
cost of debt. A negative relationship between disclosure and the cost of debt is hypothesised. 
The reason for this is that, firms with increased levels of disclosure could be perceived to have a 
lower likelihood of withholding valuable unfavourable information, resulting in a lower risk 
premium being charged, which would decrease the cost of debt. 
Sengupta (1998) uses the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) ratings 
of disclosure as a proxy for the quality of disclosure. His sample covered companies who had 
disclosure ratings for the years 1987-1991. The cost of debt was measured as the yield to 
maturity and the effective interest cost to the issuer (Sengupta, 1998). His findings indicate that 
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there is a significant negative relationship between a finn's overall disclosure and the cost of 
debt. 
2.8.2. Cost of Equity Capital 
Botosan (1997) was one of the first researchers in this area of research. In her study she 
estimated the cost of equity capital using an accounting based valuation model developed by 
Edwards and Bell (1961), Ohlsen (1995) and Feltham and Ohlsen (1995). Her results show that 
the estimates for the cost of equity capital are both increasing in beta and decreasing in firm size 
and therefore are reasonable. Botosan's study investigated disclosure levels provided in the 1990 
annual reports for a sample of firms in the manufacturing industry. She developed her own 
measure of disclosure level, which was based on the amount of voluntary disclosure provided. 
The association between disclosure and cost of equity capital is tested after controlling for market 
beta and firm size. Botosan's (1997) results reveal that there is a negative association between 
cost of equity capital and disclosure; however these results were only significant for those firms 
with low analyst following. Botosan (1997) also finds that for firms with low analyst following, 
disclosure of forecast infonnation and key non-financial statistics is important. For firms that 
have a high analyst following disclosure of historical information is found to be advantageous. 
As Botosan's study only looked at one particular industry and for one year no generalisation can 
be made from the findings. 
Extending Bot05on' s study Richardson and Welker (2001) tested the association between 
financial as well as social disclosure and the cost of equity capital. Social disclosure can also 
reduce the cost of equity capital by reducing transaction cost and reducing estimation risk 
(Richardson, Welker and Hutchinson, 1999). Richardson and Welker (2001) also estimate the 
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cost of equity capital using an accounting based valuation model. However their study used the 
Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) rankings of disclosure for US 
companies. Thus their study examines a far greater number of companies than Botosan (1997). 
Richardson and Welker (2001) find that there is a significant negative relationship between the 
level of financial disclosure and the cost of equity capital. They also confirm Botosan's (1997) 
result that this relationship is more prevalent for firms that have a low analyst following. For 
social disclosure a significant positive relationship was found between the level of social 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital. This relationship is however not affected by the number 
of analysts following the firm. 
Botosan and Plumlee (2001) also examine the association between disclosure and the cost of 
equity capital. Their study also estimates the cost of equity capital as the previous two studies 
and uses the AIMR ratings as a proxy for disclosure scores. Botosan and Plumlee (200 I) extend 
their research one step further and look at the relationship between the three types of disclosure 
(which are annual report disclosure, timeliness of disclosure and level of investor relations) that 
make up the overall disclosure ranking and the cost of equity capital. 
Their results show that greater total disclosure is not significantly associated with a lower cost of 
equity capital. However when looking at the individual components of the overall disclosure, 
different relationships evolve. They show that the cost of equity capital is negatively related to 
the quality of annual report disclosure and positively related to the timeliness of disclosure as 
represented by quarterly disclosures. They find no association between the cost of equity capital 
and the level of investor relations activities as measured by presentations to analysts and analyst 
interviews. 
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Outside of the US, Hail (2001) examined the relationship between levels of disclosure and the 
cost of equity exhibited by Swiss Firms. His estimates for the cost of equity capital were derived 
in the same way as in the previously discussed researches, whilst the disclosure index used was 
independently developed by the Swiss Banking Institute. 
The results of his study show that there is a highly significant negative relationship between the 
estimate for the cost of equity capital and the disclosure rankings. As with Botosan's (1997) 
study this research was only done for a one year period, 1997, and therefore caution must once 
again be taken when interpreting the results. 
2.8.3. South African evidence of a negative association between the level of disclosure and 
the Cost of Equity Capital 
There is currently no published study which investigates the negative association between the 
level of disclosure and the cost of equity capital in the South African market. This study 
investigates the relationship between cost of equity capital and disclosure levels using the direct 
method of testing, which will involve estimating the cost of equity capital. The following chapter 
develops the methodology and hypotheses used in the research. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
The cost of equity capital is estimated for each firm in the sample and then compared to the 
respective level of disclosure for each firm, thereby adopting the direct method of testing. The 
methodology will firstly develop the hypotheses tested in this study and then discuss the model 
used and each of the dependent and independent variables in this model. The selection of the 
sample, main test and sensitivity tests will then be discussed. 
3.1. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1.1. Hypothesis Development 
There are two main streams of research that support the negative association between the cost of 
equity capital and increased disclosure levels. The first stream of research suggests that 
increased disclosure increases stock market liquidity through decreasing information asymmetry 
between investors. This in turn will reduce the cost of equity capital either through decreased 
transaction costs or an increased demand for the firm's shares (Botosan, 1997; Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002; Richardson and Welker, 2001; Hail, 2001). 
The second stream of research shows that increased disclosure levels reduces the estimation risk 
with regard to the estimates of a firm's asset return or the dividend distribution by decreasing 
the information asymmetry between management and investors. There is more uncertainty 
regarding these estimates when there is less information about a particular firm. Therefore an 
increased amount of disclosure will decrease this uncertainty and will also decrease the amount 
of estimation risk. Handa and Linn (1993) and Coles et al. (1995) conclude that estimation risk 
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cannot be diversified and therefore investors will reqUire compensation for this risk. This 
results m the relationship that increased disclosure will lead to less uncertainty and less 
estimation risk. This will in turn lead to investors requiring less of a premium for the risk and 
overall reducing the cost of equity capital (Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; 
Richardson and Welker, 2001; Hail, 2001). 
The two streams of prior research discussed above both conclude that by increasing disclosure 
levels a firm's cost of equity capital may be reduced. Therefore the following hypothesis has 
been developed: 
HI: There is a negative association between the level and quality of voluntary disclosure 
and the cost of equity capital. 
The measure for the level of disclosure that will be used, is a disclosure score developed for the 
top 100 companies on the JSE Securities Exchange (JSE). This disclosure score is made up of 
four components namely, performance review, financial disclosure, forward-looking 
information and presentation. All four of these components are weighted to give the overall 
disclosure score. The following hypothesis is also expected to hold for each of these 4 
components: 
H2: There is a negative association between each of the four components of the overall 
voluntary disclosure score and the cost of equity capital. 
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3.1.2. The Model 
The above hypotheses can be expressed as a mode I that states that a firm's cost of equ ity capital 
is dependent on four variables. Firstly, the systematic risk of a finn, which represents the risks 
specific to that particular firm. This is represented by the market beta of a firm. Secondly, the 
size of the firm that is indicated by the market capitalisation of the firm. Market capitalisation 
is the number of shares in issue multiplied by the share price. The third variable is the level of 
debt in the firm. Lastly, the level of disclosure will influence the cost of equity capital and this 
is indicated by a ranked disclosure score. The motivation for including the above independent 
variables is discussed in sections 3.3 to 3.6. 
Regressing the expected cost of equity capital against the disclosure rank, the market beta, the 
natural log of the market value of the share and the financial leverage of the finn tests the 
hypotheses. This regression equation can be described as follows: 
COE;t= a + ~IBETA + ~2LMVAL + ~3LEV + ~4DRANK ________ Equation 1 
Where: COElt Expected cost of equity capital for firm i in year t 
BETA Market beta for the firm 
LMVAL Natural log ofthe market value 
LEV Financial leverage 
DRANK Disclosure rank 
The above regression is performed for both the overall disclosure score (hypothesis one) and 
each of the four components (hypothesis two). 
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3.2. DEPENDANT VARIABLE: THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL 
The dependent variable in the above model is the cost of equity capital and is dependent on 
market beta, market value, financial leverage and disclosure rank. In order to regress the model 
an estimate of the cost of equity capital needs to be made. There are various methods to 
estimate the value of a firm's cost of equity capital each with their own advantages and 
disadvantages, four approaches are discussed. 
This study adopts the residual income model approach as its main estimate for the cost of equity 
capital. The CAPM is also used to estimate the cost of equity capital to test the robustness of the 
result achieved using the residual income model. 
3.2.1. Average realised returns 
One specific approach is to estimate the cost of equity capital using average realised returns. 
However, prior research has found it difficult to prove a significant relationship between 
average realised returns and market beta. This is significant as market beta is generally 
regarded as a measure of systematic risk for a firm (Ross, Westerfield, Jordaan and Firer, 1996). 
As the risk of the firm increases, investors will require a higher return, which will increase the 
cost of equity capital. Therefore one would expect a significant relationship between beta and 
an estimate for the cost of equity capital. Lakonishok (1993) concluded that in order for market 
beta to have a significant relationship with average realised returns, 70 years of data would be 
needed. Therefore this approach of estimating the cost of equity capital would be inappropriate 
for this study as the study is only looking at 5 years of data. 
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3.2.2. Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
Another widely used measure to estimate the cost of equity capital is the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM). The CAPM defines the cost of equity capital as the sum of the risk free rate 
and the product of the firm's market beta and the expected market risk premium (Ross, 
Westerfield, Jordaan and Firer, 1996). Therefore the CAPM implies that only a cross-sectional 
difference in market beta would cause a difference in the cost of equity capital between firms. 
However this study assumes that a cross-sectional variation in beta and disclosure levels will 
result in a variation of the cost of equity capital. The CAPM therefore makes no provision for 
the level of information made available (Botosan, 1997). 
If the CAPM is used as an estimate for the cost of equity capital, one has to assume that cross-
sectional differences in disclosure level will induce a variation in beta, as only a cross-sectional 
difference in beta will cause a change to the cost of equity capital. The empirical findings with 
regard to the relationship between disclosure and beta are contradictory. Singhvi and Desai 
(1971), Choi (1973) and Kochanek (1974) all find a negative relationship between the quality of 
disclosure and risk, which is measured by market beta. In contrast to this Garsombke (1976), 
Ohlsen (1979) and Botosan (1997) all find that there is no significant relationship. 
In South African, Negash (1995) finds that there is no significant relationship between the level 
of disclosure and beta. Scott (2001) confirms Negash's (1995) findings and shows that for two 
out of the three years tested, there is no significant relationship and only in one year there was a 
moderate significant relationship between beta and the quality of disclosure. Therefore using 
the CAPM to estimate the cost of equity capital would not be appropriate, as previous studies 
have found that there is no significant relationship between disclosure and beta in South Africa. 
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3.2.3. Earnings-to-price ratio 
A third estimate of the cost of equity capital is the earnings-to-price ratio adjusted for growth 
and dividend payout. Firer (1993) argues that this measure can only be used when the expected 
future earnings is equal to the current earnings adjusted for growth at a rate equal to the cost of 
equity capital. Botosan (1997) confirms prior research which found that there was no 
connection between earnings-to-price ratios and the measure of risk, beta. Therefore this 
measure appears not to provide a reliable measure of the cost of equity capital. 
3.2.4. Residual Income Model 
The fourth approach used by Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee (2000), Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000), Richardson and Welker (2001) and Hail (2001) estimates the expected 
cost of equity capital using an accounting based valuation model. This accounting based 
valuation model was developed by Ohlsen (1995) and Feltham and Ohlsen (1995). The 
accounting based valuation model is often referred to as the residual income model. 
This model represents firm value as a function of current and forecasted accounting data, 
subject to clean surplus accounting. For clean surplus accounting to apply, all future changes in 
the book value of equity must arise either from earnings, capital contributions or dividends 
(Hail, 200 I). 
The model estimates the intrinsic value of the firm, which is defined as the book value of equity 
plus the present value of future residual income. Residual income is net income after tax less a 
required Rand return on the assets invested in the firm (Horngren, Foster, Datar and Uliana, 
1999). The required rate of return used will be the cost of equity capital. The implied cost of 
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equity capital will then be the rate that equates the intrinsic value of the firm to the current 
market price of the share (Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan, 2000; Hail, 2001). Therefore the 
cost of equity capital is the rate that investors discount future expected residual income to arrive 
at the current market price for a share. 
The derivation of the residual income model starts with the dividend discount model. This 
model states that the value of the firm is equal to the present value of all future dividends and is 
defined as follows: 
______________________ Equation 2 
Where Vt Intrinsic value of the firm at time t 
Net dividends paid during the period (t-1, t) 
The discount rate (cost of equity capital) 
Applying clean surplus accounting the following relationship can be expressed: 
________________________ Equation 3 
Where bV t Accounting book value of equity at date t 
Accounting book value of equity at date t-1 
Accounting earnings for the period (t-1, t) 
Dividends for period (t-1, t) 
This expression shows that the book value of equity in any year is equal to the book value of 
equity at the beginning of that year plus the earnings for the year less any dividends paid 
(Ohlsen, 1995). 
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To determine the residual income model, Equation 3 is solved for dividends and is substituted 
into the traditional dividend discount model (Equation 2). This substitution will result in the 
following model: 
00 
V t = bVt + L Ed Xt+T - re * bVt+T-l 
T=l (l+re)T 
00 (PROFt+T - re) bVt+T-l 
= bVt + L Ed ______________ Equation 4 
T=l (l + re) T 
Where PROFt After-tax return on book value of equity for period (t-l, t) 
From the above equation, firm value can be expressed as the book value of equity today plus the 
infinite sum of the discounted expected residual income in the future. Equation 4 expresses the 
value of the firm in terms of accounting numbers being future earnings, current and expected 
book values of equity. It must be noted that Equation 4 is the residual income version of the 
dividend discount model. 
By setting the intrinsic value in Equation 4 equal to the share price, the implied discount rate 
can be solved by an iterative process. This implied discount rate would then represent the 
estimated cost of equity capital. 
The intrinsic value of a firm can only be made equal to the share price if it is assumed that all 
publicly available information is impounded in the share price. This would require the South 
African market to be semi-strong form efficient. A semi-strong form efficient market is one in 
which all publicly available information is included in the price of a share (Ross, Westerfield, 
Jordaan and Firer, 1996). South African evidence shows that the market is semi-strong form 
(Knight and Affleck-Graves, 1985; Ooms, Archer, and Smit, 1987; Bhana, 1989) therefore all 
Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital: 41 
C!nutl. .d ' .. ;lOn" -':;\,;AOHfOfl 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
publicly available information can be assumed to be included in the share price of South African 
shares listed on the JSE Securities Exchange. 
Equation .j requIres forecasting future earnIngs and book values to infinity. As this is 
practically impossible one needs to make estimates for a finite period and then calculate a 
terminal value at the end of the finite period (Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan, 2000; Hail, 
2001). This study follows the approach of Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2000), Hail (2001) 
and Richardson and Welker (2001) and applies a three-stage approach to calculating the 
intrinsic value of a firm. 
1. Use explicit earnings forecasts for the first three years. 
2. Derive earnings forecasts by linearly fading year t+ 3 after tax return on book value 
equity to the median market return on equity by year t+T. This simple linear 
interpolation reverts the firms after tax return on book value equity, at year t+ 3, to the 
industry's mean after tax return on book value equity at the end of year t+T. This 
attempts to encapsulate the long-term erosion of abnormal return on equity and the 
notion that in the long-run individual firms tend to achieve the same as the industry 
average (Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan, 2000). 
3. Calculate terminal value by assuming year t+ T residual income as a perpetuity. This 
does not imply that there is no growth in earnings or dividends. What it does assume is 
that any incremental economic profits, those from net new investments, are zero after 
year T. Therefore any growth is neutral after year T (Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan, 
2000). 
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By using this 3-stage approach Equation 4 can be rewritten in a finite form as follows: 
(Xt+T - re * bVt+T-I) 
(1 + re) T 
T 
+I 
T=n+) 
+ ---,-( x;..:.t>":-+.LT +'-'1_----=->[ e~*___=b-'-V_'_'t+_'_T.L) __ 
re (1 + re)T 
__________________ Equation 5 
Where Xt+T Expected future accounting earnings for period (t+ T -1, t+ T) 
Expected future accounting book value of equity for year t+ T 
bVt+T_1 + Xt+T - dt+T 
Expected future net dividends 
dividend payout ratio, k * Xt+T 
The explicit time period used is important, as we are now determining a finite time period and 
calculating a terminal value after the specific time period. When looking at what time period to 
use, Hail (2001) suggests that the intrinsic value of the firm, as calculated as a function of 
forecasted earnings and future book values, tends to the value of the share as the time period 
tends to infinity. In a previoLls study, Bernard (1995) also suggests that the intrinsic value tends 
to the firms share price so long as the time period used is long enough. Following Gebhardt, 
Lee and Swaminathan (2000), Hail (2001) and Richardson and Welker (2001) this study 
explicitly forecasts earnings for a three year period, earnings forecasts are then interpolated for a 
further nine years and the terminal value is then calculated at the end of the 12th year. This can 
be expressed as follows: 
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3 (Xt+T - re * bVt+T-l) 12 (Xt+T - re * bVt+T-l) 
V, = bv, + L: 
T=\ (1 + re)T 
+L: (1 + re)T 
1'=4 
\ ) \ ) y Y 
Stage 1 Stage 2 
+ _________________ Equation 6 
\'--~ ~---') y 
Stage 3 
Referring the above equation back to the three-stage approach, stage one explicitly forecasts 
earnings for a three year period, stage two derives earnings forecasts by linearly fading year 
three's earnings forecasts to the average return on equity of the market over a nine year period 
and stage three determines a terminal value at the end of year twelve by assuming that year 
twelve's residual income will continue into perpetuity. 
The cost of equity capital is then determined by setting the intrinsic value of the firm (V,) equal 
to the market price of the share (P,) and solving for the cost of equity capital (re). 
3.3. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUALITY OF DISCLOSURE 
The first independent variable is the quality of disclosure. The disclosure variable is intended to 
capture the cross-sectional variation in disclosure quality between firms. The South African 
Companies Act, JSE Requirements together with South African Statements of GAAP requires 
certain minimum disclosure levels. Companies are however encouraged to provide additional 
voluntary disclosure. 
To assess the quality of disclosure between firms, this study focuses on the disclosure provided 
in the annual report. The annual report is only one source of information disclosed to 
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stakeholders, others sources would include press releases and direct communication with 
analysts. However Lang and Lundholm (1993) show that annual report disclosure is positively 
correlated with the amount of disclosure provided via other sources. Therefore it is suggested 
that the annual report may be used as a proxy for the overall disclosure level about a firm in the 
market. Another advantage of using the annual report is that they are more easily comparable 
between companies than other forms of communication, for example press releases or direct 
contact with analysts (Hail, 200 I). 
As a measure for the level of disclosure provided by the annual report the study will be using 
the disclosure scores developed by the Excellence in Financial Reporting competition. Both 
regulatory and voluntary disclosure is assessed in determining the scores. As all companies are 
required to provide the regulatory disclosure it will only be the voluntary disclosure that would 
differentiate each company. Therefore this study is primarily looking at the different levels of 
voluntary disclosure provided by companies. The Excellence in Financial Reporting analysis 
looks at the annual financial statements of the top 100 companies on the JSE Securities 
Exchange (JSE). The top 100 companies are determined according to their market 
capitalisation as at the 31 October every year. For example the 2002 report would have 
reviewed the annual financial statements for the top 100 companies with a year end between 1 
November 2000 and 31 October 2001. 
The annual financial statements are adjudicated by three University of Cape Town professors, 
who mark according to a flexible mark plan which allows for specific circumstances that might 
apply to one company and not another. This mark plan is however not made public as it only 
forms a basis to start from and then professional judgement is used to determine the actual 
classifications of the companies. A second reason why the mark plan is not made public is that 
it might encourage competition among the various companies. The mark plan also changes 
from year to year to incorporate new accounting standards. Companies are rewarded for early 
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adoption of South African standards and also for compliance with International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Excellence in Financial Reporting, 2002). 
The mark plan used is divided into four categories. Firstly, performance review, which deals 
primarily with non-statutory matters, overall review of the nature of the business and its 
performance and an explanation ofthe business environment. The performance review need not 
be confined to the year under review and should include ratios and growth rates. All corporate 
governance disclosure falls within this category. The performance review section has 
approximately a weighting of 35 % (Excellence in Financial Reporting, 2002). 
The second category is financial disclosure. This category focuses on good accounting and 
clear understandable reporting. Specific accounting issues that are a result of new standards and 
which can significantly affect the reported profit and/or balance sheet relationships are incl~'ded 
in the mark plan. Adjudicators have found in the past, companies tend not to comply fully with 
newly issued statements and therefore credit is given just for compliance with new standards. 
The way in which accounting statements are applied is also taken into account. This section 
contributes 35 % towards the overall weighting (Excellence in Financial Reporting, 2002). 
The third section deals with forward-looking information. This section recognises that 
historical information is a useful base to make forecasts. Credit is given if the forecasts made 
have been evaluated against the risks of the company. Therefore points are given for 
information regarding financial and other risks as well as indicators of long-term financial 
targets. Credit is also given for industry and market-related information. The forward-looking 
information has a weighting of around 20% (Excellence in Financial Reporting, 2002) 
The last category looks at presentation and is the smallest section. This section is subjective and 
allows for the adjudicator's impression of layout, graphics and the readability of the annual 
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financial statements. This section has a weighting of less than 10% (Excellence in Financial 
Reporting, 2002). 
The report for each year ranks the top ten companies and the remaining 90 companies are 
divided into four categories namely, excellent, good, adequate and unsatisfactory. The 
companies are however not ranked in the four different classifications. This study will be using 
the raw disclosure scores as a measure for the disclosure level of each of the top 100 companies. 
3.4. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: MARKET BETA 
Market beta is included in the above model to take into account market volatility (Gebhardt, Lee 
and Swaminathan, 2000). A firm's beta measures the systematic risk of a company, which is 
market risk attributable to common macroeconomic factors that all firms face (Bodie, Kane and 
Marcus, 1999). Beta measures the sensitivity of a share price to movements of the market as a 
whole (Bodie, Kane and Marcus, 1999). The higher beta is the more sensitive that particular 
share is to changes in the market. 
Only systematic risk has been taken into account as unsystematic risk will be diversified away 
in a portfol io of assets and would therefore have no effect on the cost of equity capital. 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) suggests that a firm's beta will be positively 
correlated with cost of equity capital and therefore needs to be included in the model. CAPM 
states that a firm's cost of equity capital is a function of the risk free rate, firm's beta and the 
market risk premium (Ross, Westerfield, 10rdaan and Firer, 1996). Therefore if beta were left 
out of the model it would distort the results. Both beta and leverage have been included in the 
model as they are each correlated with the cost of equity capital. However beta and leverage 
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may also be correlated with each other. Therefore when performing the multiple regression 
analysis an adjustment will be made to take into account this multicollinearity. 
The beta values used in this study are calculated by The Financial Risk Services. The Financial 
Risk Services is based on American and United Kingdom experience and is part of an on-going 
research programme at the University of Cape Town, South Africa (Financial Risk Services, 
2002). 
Betas are calculated by regressing the monthly returns for a share against the corresponding 
monthly returns for the JSE Actuaries All Share Index. Beta will then be the slope of the 
regression line (Ross, Westerfield, Jordaan and Firer, 1996). The Financial Risk Service 
implements two refinements in their calculation of beta. Firstly, they implement the Bayesian 
adjustment, which takes into account prior information of betas (Financial Risk Service, 2002). 
This adjustment reduces the loss of accuracy and efficiency in estimating beta (Bowie and 
Bradfield, 1993). 
The second adjustment is implemented to overcome the problem of thin trading. Thin trading 
arises when a company's share is not regularly traded on the securities exchange. Ball (1977) 
Scholes and Williams (1977) were two of many authors that investigated the effect of thin 
trading on beta estimations. They concluded that betas are susceptible to bias in thinly traded 
markets. Therefore the Financial Risk Service implements a trade-to-trade procedure to 
overcome the problem of thin trading on the JSE Securities Exchange (Financial Risk Service, 
2002). 
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3.5. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: FIRM SIZE 
The third independent variable is firm size. Firm size is important as more information is 
readily available for larger firms than smaller firms, and therefore firm size can be used as a 
proxy for the level of information available (Banz, 1981; Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan, 
2000). The risk of investing in a company increases when there is less information about that 
particular company. The increase in risk could potentially increase the firm's cost of equity 
capital. This study will use market value of a firm's shares as a proxy for firm size. 
Botosan (1997) states there is a significant relationship between market value and the cost of 
equity capital, as well as between market value and disclosure levels. Therefore if it were left 
out of the model it would be a correlated omitted variable. As larger firms provide more 
information and therefore have a lower risk attached to them, it can be expected that larger firms 
will have a lower cost of equity capital than a smaller firm. This results in an estimated 
negative relationship between market value and the cost of equity capital. 
The sample of this study consists of the top 100 companies on the JSE Securities Exchange. 
Even though the sample only consists of the largest 100 companies there is still merit in firm 
size as an independent variable as there is a large variation in size of companies in the sample. 
The largest company in the sample has a market capitalisation of R269 billion and the smallest 
company has a market capitalisation of R320 million. Therefore as there is a large variation one 
would expect that this variable would have an impact on the cost of equity capital. 
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3.6. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: FINANCIAL LEVERAGE 
The final independent variable used in the model to explain the cost of equity capital is financial 
leverage. Financial leverage is included as, according to Modigliani and Miller, a firm's cost of 
equity capital should be positively related to the amount of debt in the firm's capital structure. 
This relationship holds as the more debt a company takes on, the more likely it will be that the 
company will face bankruptcy costs and therefore the firm will be more risky for an investor. 
Leading on from this, the more risky a company is the higher the required rate of return will be. 
Consequently the more debt a firm has, the more risky it is and therefore the firm's cost of 
equity capital is estimated to be higher. However beta and leverage may also be correlated with 
each other. Therefore when performing the multiple regression analysis an adjustment will be 
made to take into account this multicollinearity. 
3.7. SAMPLE SELECTION 
The sample consists of the top 100 companies on the JSE Securities exchange included in the 
excellence in financial reporting survey for the years 1999 to 2003. As only the top 100 
companies are included there may be selection bias in the sample. The financial reporting 
survey is performed at 31 October each year and published in the subsequent year. The 
excellence in financial reporting started in 1997, however the method used for 1997 and 1998 
were different to subsequent years and have therefore been ignored. Therefore the sample years 
are 1999 until 2003, resulting in a 500 firm-year end sample. 
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3.8. DATA 
The following section will set out exactly what data sets are required and at which date these 
data points are taken for this study. 
3.8.1. Dependent Variable: Cost of Equity Capital 
The cost of equity capital is calculated six months after the year end to ensure that all publicly 
available information from the particular year end is included in the cost of equity capital. 
Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee (200 I), Richardson and Welker (2001) and Hail (2001) 
have all applied this approach in their respective studies. 
In order to calculate the cost of equity capital the following data points are used for each firm: 
• Earnings forecasts for the 2 subsequent years, six months after the year end for each 
company in the sample. Earning forecast figures are obtained from Reuters. 
• Share prices six months after the year end. These were obtained from McGregors. 
• Book value of equity at the beginning of the financial year end was obtained from the 
published annual financial statements. 
• The dividend payout ratio for each firm was obtained from BFA McGregors. 
• The average return on equity for the ALSI for the last five years was obtained from BFA 
McGregors. 
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3.8.2. Independent Variables 
3.8.2.1. Disclosure Scores 
The disclosure scores are obtained from the Excellence in Financial Reporting analysis 
performed each year. As the mark plan varies across the different years in the sample and 
certain marks available are not applicable to all companies, the disclosure scores need to be 
standardised. In order to achieve this, disclosure scores were divided by the total number of 
marks available each year. If a certain number of marks were not applicable to a certain 
company, these were subtracted from the total available. The following equation illustrates the 
adjustment made: 
STD DISC t = DISC t I (TOTAL t - N/A) ______________ Equation 7 
Where: STD DISC Standardised Disclosure Score 
DISC Disclosure Score from the Excellence in Financial Reporting 
analysis 
TOTAL Total number of marks available for year t 
N/A The number of marks that were not applicable for that 
particular company 
Cooke (1998) suggests that the original disclosure scores should not be used in a disclosure 
study, as the theoretically correct relationship between the independent and dependent variables 
are not known. Thus interpreting the significance of a study using the disclosure scores would 
be problematic. Cooke (1998) suggests three transformations of the disclosure scores to 
improve the interpretation of regression analysis results: 
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I. The Rank Regression Approach 
This procedure ranks the disclosure scores in ascending order. The advantages of the rank 
transformation include: no need to standardise, log or undertake any power transformation 
as it results in the same rank, the ranks are insensitive to outliers, useful when the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variable is not strictly linear and there 
is no basis for suggesting a relationship. The disadvantages highlighted by Cooke (1998) 
are that it is difficult to test the significance of the estimated coefficients in multiple 
regression analysis and that the data after transformation are ordinal rather than interval. 
2. Normal Scores Approach 
This method is an extension of the rank regression approach. The ranked disclosure scores 
are substituted by the scores in the normal distribution. The main advantage of the 
approach is that significance levels can be interpreted more accurately using the t and F-
tests. 
3. Log of the odds ratio Approach 
This method assumes that the assumptions of linear regression hold. There is a problem in 
disclosure studies in that the disclosure scores are bounded between zero and 100%. One 
method to overcome this problem is to use the log of the odds ratio. The disclosure scores 
are transformed by as follows: 
In [DISC / (I-DISC)] __________________ Equation 8 
This approach will ensure that the range of transformed disclosure scores follows the 
normal distribution. 
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This study will be applying a modification of the rank regression method suggested by Cooke 
(1998). A fractional rank of the disclosure score will be calculated. By using the fractional 
rank testing the significance of the estimated coefficient and interpretation of the results is made 
easier, thereby overcoming the shortfalls identified by Cooke (1998). This method has 
previously been used by Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee (2001), Richardson and Welker 
(2001) and Hail (2001). 
In order to calculate the fractional ranks, the firms in the sample are ranked in ascending order 
so that the firm that provided the highest level of disclosure will receive the highest rank. 
Therefore if greater disclosure results in a lower cost of equity capital there should be a negative 
relationship. The fractional rank will then be the rank of the firm divided by the number of 
observations for that year. 
3.8.2.2. Beta values, Market Capitalisation and Financial Leverage 
Beta values six months after the year end are obtained from the Financial Risk Services. Market 
capitalisation is taken at the end of the particular year end. Market capitalisation is calculated 
by multiplying the number of shares issued by the closing share price. Share prices can be 
assumed to be normally distributed due to the random walk principle (Ross, Westerfield, 
Jordaan and Firer, \996). However the number of shares can not be assumed to be normally 
distributed. Therefore to adjust for this the natural log of the market capitalisation values are 
taken. Finally, financial leverage is taken at the financial year end and calculated on the book 
values of both equity and debt. 
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3.9. MAIN HYPOTHESIS TEST 
The main test of this study will look to regress the model depicted in Equation 1 for the 5 year 
sample. Market conditions across the five year period may be different and therefore dummy 
variables are included to account for this. 
Dummy variables (000, 001, 002 and 003) have been included in the above model for the 
different years of each observation. The base category for the dummy variables is the year 
1999. All the other years have been assigned a dummy variable with a value of I if the year 
corresponds to that dummy variable. For example if the observation is in the year 2003, 003 
will be assigned with value of 1 and all the other dummy variables are assigned a value of zero. 
Not including the dummy variables may result in excluding an explanatory variable. Equation 1 
will now include the dummy variables and is described as follows: 
~6DOI + ~7D02 + ~8D03 _________________ Equation 9 
Where: a Constant variable 
Expected cost of equity capital for firm i in year t 
BETA Market beta for the firm 
LMVAL Natural log of the market val ue 
LEV Financial leverage 
DRANK Disclosure rank 
000 Dummy Variable for year 2000 
DOl Dummy Variable for year 200 I 
002 Dummy Variable for year 2002 
003 Dummy Variable for year 2003 
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The first test performed is simple ordinary least squares regression. This regresses the cost of 
equity capital separately against each of the four independent variables, namely beta, market 
capitalisation, leverage and disclosure ranks. The calculated Pearson correlations coefficients 
will give an indication if there is any relationship between these variables and the cost of equity 
capital. 
The next step is to carry out a multiple ordinary least squares regression analysis in which the 
cost of equity capital is regressed against all four independent variables including the dummy 
variables. This allows for interactions between the independent variables. The expected 
relationships are that beta should have a positive relationship, market value should have a 
negative relationship, financial leverage should have a positive relationship and fractional 
disclosure rank should have a negative relationship with the cost of equity capital. 
The multiple regressIOn analysis will be performed for both the overall disclosure rank 
(Hypothesis 1), as well as each of the four components of the disclosure score (Hypothesis 2). 
3.10. DIAGNOSTIC TESTING 
In interpreting the results of the ordinary least squares regression analysis certain assumptions 
have to hold in order for the inferences to be valid. The following assumptions need to be met: 
(Allison, 1999; Chatterjee, Hadi and Price, 2000; Sen and Srivastava, 1990) 
I. Linearity - The dependant variable y is a linear function of the independent variables x '5 
and the random residual term c. In order to check for linearity the following plots of the 
standardised residuals will be used: 
• Scatter plot of the standardised residuals against each of the independent variables . 
Under the standard assumptions the standardised residuals are uncorrelated with each of 
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the independent variables. If this assumption holds then this scatter plot will be a 
random scatter of points. 
• Scatter plot of the standardised residuals versus the fitted values. Under the standard 
assumptions the standardised residuals are also uncorrelated with the fitted values. 
Therefore this plot should also show a random scatter of points. 
2. Mean Independence - The residual terms have a mean, or average value, of zero. 
3. Homoscedasticity - The residual terms have the same variance (i. This is the constant 
variance assumption. When this assumption does not hold the residuals are said to exhibit 
heteroscedasticity, which means that the degree of random noise in the linear equation 
varies with the values of x. 
Heteroscedasticity does not produce any bias in the coefficient estimates, but it does have 
the following two consequences: 
• Inefficiency - The least squares estimates do not have minimum standard errors. This 
indicates that an alternative method may produce a better result. Ordinary least squares 
is not optimal when there is heteroscedasticity as it gives equal weightings to all 
observation, however observations with a larger variance contains less information than 
observations with a small variance. This can be solved using a weighted least squares 
method. 
• Biased standard residuals - If heteroscedasticity is present the standard residuals can be 
biased. This will lead to bias in test statistics and confidence intervals. This problem 
can be corrected by using a robust standard error. This method will not change the 
coefficient estimates and therefore will not solve the problem of inefficiency. However 
this method will provide reasonably accurate probability values. This method is 
preferred over the weighted least squares method as fewer assumptions are required 
(Allison, 1999: 127). 
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Heteroscedasticity can be detected by using graphs and statistical tests. The two scatter 
plots discussed under the assumption of linearity can also be used to detect 
heteroscedasticity. A statistical test that can be used is the White test. 
4. Independent Residuals - This assumption assumes that the residuals are independent of 
each other. When this assumption does not hold a problem of autocorrelation exists. The 
consequences of autocorrelation are identical to those of heteroscedasticity. The only 
difference is that the bias in the standard residuals will almost always be biased downwards 
resulting in less accurate coefficients. This will in turn result in test statistics that will be 
biased upwards resulting in concluding that relationships exist when they do not. 
Autocorrelation can be detected by USing the Durban-Watson test which will conclude 
whether there is either positive autocorrelation, negative autocorrelation or inconclusive. 
Another statistical test Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test available on E-Views 
will also be used. 
To adjust for autocorrelation the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure can be used. This method 
works as follows: 
• Estimate the ordinary regression: Y I = a + PXj + Uj 
• Use the residuals from the 1 st step to run a regression of the following equation to derive 
an estimate of p: UI = PUI + e I 
• Use this estimate of p to transform the original variables in the following equation: 
• Estimate the transformed regression to obtain an estimate of p: 
where Yt ' = Y I - pY t. 1 and X t • = XI - PXt-1 and a • = a (l-p) 
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The above adjustment can be carried out step by step, however E-views has an automatic 
adjustment which performs the above adjustment in the background. To adjust for 
autocorrelation using E-Views the function AR( 1) is added to the end of the regression 
expression. This would adjust for first order autocorrelation. 
5. Normality Assumption - The residuals are assumed to have a normal distribution. The 
criteria of that the residuals are not biased and are efficient does not depend on this 
assumption. If the sample size is large enough, one may be able to use ordinary least 
squares regression even of the residuals are not normally distributed according to 
Srivastava's (1971) theorem which is proved using the central limit theorem proved by 
Gnedenko and Kolmogorov (1954) (Sen, Srivastava, 1990: 106-109). 
The normality assumption may be detected using the following techniques: 
• Graphical methods including a histogram 
• Statistical methods including: Jarque-Bera test, Lilliefors test and Chi-squared test of 
normality. 
3.11. TESTING VALIDITY OF VARIABLES 
The validity of the estimated cost of equity capital values and the ranked disclosure scores are 
tested to determine whether they are appropriate to be used in the study. The following two 
sections detail the respective validity tests. 
3.11.1. Test validity of Cost of Equity Capital 
The first variable that is tested for validity is the estimate of the cost of equity capital. A valid 
estimate for the cost of equity capital should be increasing in risk, which is measured by beta 
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(Botosan, 1997). This relationship holds because as risk increases investors will require a 
higher return and in turn this should increase the cost of equity capital. Secondly, the cost of 
equity capital should also have a negative relationship with the size of a firm as measured by the 
market capitalisation of that firm (Botosan, 1997). As the size of the firm increases more 
information is produced and therefore the estimation risk around the firm decreases. As the risk 
decreases so should the required rate of return of the investors and consequently the cost of 
equity capital should also decrease. The last relationship that should hold is that with the 
financial leverage of the firm. The greater the use of debt in a firm, the greater the risk of 
bankruptcy is (Ross, Westerfield, 10rdaan and Firer, 1996). As the risk increases so should the 
required rate of return and as a result the cost of equity capital should be increased. 
Therefore in order to test the validity of the cost of capital estimates the following equation will 
be regressed. 
_______________ Equation 10 
Where: r,t Expected cost of equity capital for firm i in year t 
BETA Market beta for the firm 
LMVAL Natural log of the market value 
LEV Financial leverage 
In order for the cost of equity capital estimates to be valid, the following relationships should 
hold: a positive relationship with beta, a negative relationship with market value and a positive 
relationship with financial leverage. 
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3.11.2. Test validity of Disclosure Scores 
The second variable that is tested for validity is the disclosure score. In assessing the validity of 
the disclosure rank certain relationships should hold. Ahmed (1995) provides an analysis of 23 
separate studies of the relationship between disclosure and firm characteristics. He finds that 
the following four variables have a statistically significant positive association with disclosure 
level: firm size, exchange listing status, audit firm size and leverage. Botosan (1997) used the 
above characteristics in assessing the validity of her disclosure score, whilst Hail (2001) used 
the number of analysts following a firm and the average return over the last five years for the 
firm. Richardson and Welker (2001) assessed the validity of their disclosure index by 
exammmg the relationship between firm size, financial performance, leverage and analyst 
following. 
This study will combine all these approaches and assess the validity of the disclosure ranks by 
examining the relationship with firm size as indicated by market capitalisation, financial 
performance as indicated by the average return over five years, listing status which is whether 
they are listed on a foreign exchange, financial leverage and audit firm size which is whether 
their audit firm is one of the big four or not. In order to test these relationships the following 
regression equation will be tested. 
DRANK = a + ~IRETURN + ~2LMV AL + ~3LEV + ~4L1ST + ~5AUDIT ___ Equation 11 
Where: DRANK Expected cost of equity capital for firm i in year t 
RETURN A verage return for a company over the last 5 years 
LMVAL Natural log of the market value 
LEV Financial leverage 
LIST Listing status (1 =Iisted on foreign exchange; O=otherwise not) 
AUDIT Audit status (l=audited by one of the big 4; O=otherwise not) 
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The data for the validity testing of the disclosure scores was obtained from the following 
sources: 
• The average return for each company is obtained from BFA McGregor 
• Market values were obtained from BFA McGregor 
• Financial leverage was calculated using the published financial statements 
• The listing status was obtained form BFA McGregors 
• The audit status was obtained from BFA McGregors. 
In order for the disclosure index to be valid, the relationships yielded from the regression 
analysis should reveal a positive relationship between all the firm characteristics and the 
disclosure indexes. 
3.12. ALTERNATIVE TESTING 
Alternative tests are performed to ensure that the results of the original regression analyses are 
robust and that similar results are achieved. 
3.12.1. Simultaneity Problem 
The first alternative test addresses the fact that a simultaneity problem might exist. Welker 
(1995), Harris and Muller (1999) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) all suggest that there might 
be a simultaneity problem when assessing the relationship between the cost of equity capital and 
disclosure levels. This problem exists as, when a firm considers what disclosure they are going 
to provide they take into account all the costs and benefits. One of these costs is the cost of 
equity capital. In turn this study is purporting that the cost of equity capital is determined by the 
disclosure the firm provides. Therefore a circular cause and effect relationship exists. To 
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overcome this Hail (2001) employs a two stage least squares regression. This involves firstly 
regressing the disclosure rank according to the following equation: 
DRANK(P) = a + ~IRETURN + ~2LMVAL + ~3LEV + ~4L1ST + ~5AUDIT __ Equation 12 
The next step is to determine a predicted disclosure rank for each firm using the regression 
equation determined above. This predicted disclosure rank is then substituted into the main 
equation, which is as follows: 
COEit = a + ~I BETA + ~2LMV AL + ~3LEV + ~4DRANK(P) ______ Equation 13 
This equation is then regressed with the predicted disclosure ranks from the first step and not 
the original disclosure ranks. 
3.12.2. Use of alternative measures for the disclosure scores 
The second alternative test would be to replace the fractional disclosure ranks with the different 
transformations of the disclosure scores. Four different variations of the disclosure scores will 
be used. Namely, the actual disclosure scores, the overall disclosure ratings disclosed to the 
market, the normal scores transformation and the log of the odds ratio transformation. The 
normal scores approach and the log of the odds ratio transformation are discussed in Section 
3.8.2. The study will be trying to establish whether these will impact the results of the 
regression analysis or not. 
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3.12.3. Use of Fractional Ranks for all variables 
Another alternative test would be to determine the fractional ranks of all the other variables 
being: the cost of equity capital, beta, market value and leverage. This is considered as the 
variables in the original regression are all cardinal variables except for the disclosure score, 
which is ranked. These ranked variables will then be regressed. Again the study will be 
looking for any variation in the finding of the regression analysis. 
3.12.4. Regression Analysis for each year 
This study is looking at five years of data. The original test pools all five years of data together. 
As a firm might appear in more than one year, these observations may not be independent and 
autocorrelation may exist (Richardson and Welker, 2001). Therefore the study will look at each 
year separately to determine whether a different result will be determined. 
3.12.5. Regression Analysis according to Company Year End 
The firms used in the sample all have different year ends. Therefore the sixth alternative test 
will be testing whether there is a different relationship between the cost of equity capital and 
disclosure depending on when the year end of a company is. 
3.12.6. Regression Analysis according to Industry Sector 
The firms included in the sample also come from different industries and this alternative test 
will test whether there is a different relationship for the different industries. This is of interest 
Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital: 64 
C" ........ ~,. AI F_:~ __ .. _ D ... :rI ................... 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
as some industries might be driven by different factors and this in tum will impact the 
relationship between the cost of equity capital and disclosure differently. 
3.12.7. CAPM as an estimate for the Cost of Equity Capital 
The cost of equity capital was originally estimated using the residual income model. An 
alternative test would be to estimate the cost of equity capital using Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) and then perform the original regression analysis. This alternative test could indicate 
differences in the estimate of the cost of equity capital if the results differ. 
CAPM defines the cost of equity capital as the sum of the risk free rate and the product of the 
firm's market beta and the expected market risk premium (Ross, Westerfield, Jordan and Firer, 
1996). The CAPM model is defined according the following formula: 
COE = Rr + P (Rm - Rr) Equation 14 
Where: Rr Risk free rate in the market 
B Market beta for the firm 
(Rm - Rt) Estimated market risk premium 
The proxy used for the risk free rate in the South African market is the 91 day Treasury Bill 
Rate as suggested by Firer and McLeod (1999) and Ross, Westerfield, Jordan and Firer (1996). 
The 91 day Treasury Bill Rate was obtained from the South African Reserve Bank Quarterly 
Bulletins and the beta values for each company are calculated by The Financial Risk Services. 
The value of the market risk premium on the JSE Securities Exchange has been estimated by 
Favish and Affleck-Graves (2002) as 12.3% for the years 1960 to 1985. Extending this research 
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Firer and Staunton (2002) estimate the South African market risk premium to be 8.2% for the 
years 1900 to 2001. Bradfield, Firer and Abrahams's (2002) research also indicates a market 
risk premium of 7.7% for the last 50 years and a long term risk premium of 9.5%. This study 
uses an average of all the previous research findings, except Favish and Affleck-Graves (2002) 
estimate as this was only until 1985 and the South African market has significantly changed 
since then. Therefore a market risk premium of 8.4 7% is used. 
The results of the main hypothesis test and each of the alternative tests are provided in the 
following chapter. 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The sample selected for testing the relationship between disclosure levels and the cost of equity 
capital included the top 100 companies on the JSE Securities Exchange for the years 1999 to 
2003. The original sample consisted of 500 firm year ends, however the final number of 
observations used in the study was reduced due to data restrictions and omissions. The 
following table details the derivation of the sample selected. 
TABLE 1 
Derivation of Sample Size 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
Original Sample Size 100 100 100 100 100 500 
No Earnings forecast information ( 18) (9) (8) (11 ) (10) (56) 
Incomplete data set (11 ) (9) (7) (2) (1) (27) 
Final SamEle Size 71 82 85 87 89 414 
The original sample of 500 firm year ends was reduced by 56 observations due to the lack of 
earnings forecast information that was required to estimate the cost of equity capital. A further 
27 observations were omitted due to incomplete market data being available. Due to both these 
factors the final sample size used in this study is 414 firm year ends. 
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4.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
Table 2 below presents sample statistics of the variables used to test hypothesis one. The 
descriptive statistics detailed below are for the total sample, including any outliers. The table 
shows that the mean disclosure score is 47.72%. There is considerable dispersion in the scores, 
as illustrated by the minimum and maximum values of 7.94% and 80.2% respectively, and the 
standard deviation of 13.55. The average market capitalisation of the companies included in the 
sample is R 12.84 billion. However, there is a wide range of variation in the sample as indicated 
by the maximum (R269 billion) and the minimum (R320 million) market capitalisations. The 
large variation in the disclosure scores could be due to the large variation in the company sizes, 
as larger firms are thought to produce more information. The average cost of equity capital, as 
estimated by the residual income approach, is 9.46% and also exhibits a large variation in the 
estimates. After removing the outliers the average cost of equity capital increases to 12.36%. 
TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics and Variable Definitions 
Summary Statistics 
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Median Minimum 
COE 
DISC a 
DRANK 
BETA 
LEV 
MVAL a 
LMVAL 
Variable definitions 
414 9.46 4.15 9.17 0.77 
414 47.72 13.55 46.94 7.94 
414 0.51 0.29 0.5 0.00 
414 0.89 0.32 0.88 -0.43 
414 2.57 5.42 0.95 0.00 
414 12.84 24.23 4.29 0.32 
414 15.56 1.16 15.28 12.68 
Estimated cost of equity capital using the residual income approach 
Absolute disclosure scores as a percentage 
Fractional rank of the firm's disclosure scores 
Maximum 
36.87 
80.2 
1.00 
2.04 
49.86 
269.00 
19.41 
COE 
DISC 
DRANK 
BETA Estimate of the systematic risk of a company. Beta measures the sensitivity of a share 
price to movements of the market. 
LEY 
MYAL 
LMYAL 
Financial leverage of the company 
Market value of equity in R billions. 
Natural log of the market value of equity 
a DISC and MY AL information is provided only for sample characteristics. In the regression the 
fractional rank of DISC and the natural log of MY AL is used. 
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Table 3 below provides the Pearson correlation coefficients between cost of equity capital, 
fractional disclosure rank, beta, leverage and the natural log of market capitalisation. All 
variables are calculated as discussed in Chapter 3. The correlation between COE and DRANK 
is -0.0395, which indicates that there is a negative association between the cost of equity capital 
and disclosure levels. However this is not statistically significant and therefore no conclusion 
can be reached. Cost of equity capital is positively correlated to leverage and negatively 
correlated with the market value of equity, which is consistent with the hypothesised 
relationships. The only variable which does not at this preliminary stage exhibit the predicted 
relationship is beta. This will be explored in greater detail in the discussion of the validity of 
the estimate of the cost of equity capital. 
TABLE 3 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients a 
COE DRANK BETA LEV 
COE 1.0000 
(0.0000) 
DRANK -0.0395 1.0000 
(>0.8000) (0.0000) 
BETA -0.1156 -0.0488 1.0000 
(0.0200) (0.4000) (0.0000) 
LEV 0.0009 0.1353 0.0863 1.0000 
(>0.8000) (0.0100) (0.1000) (0.0000) 
LMVAL -0.2145 0.2749 0.2133 0.2113 
(>0.001) (>0.001) (>0.001) (>0.001) 
a p-values for two-tailed test of statistical significance are provided in parentheses. 
Variables are defined in Table 2. 
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4.2. VALIDITY TESTING OF VARIABLES 
4.2.1. Disclosure Scores 
The disclosure scores developed in terms of the Excellence in Financial Reporting competition 
are used as a proxy for the level of disclosure provided by the annual financial statements. The 
Excellence in Financial Reporting develops disclosure scores on an annual basis for the top 100 
companies on the JSE Securities Exchange. The mark plan that is used each year is changed to 
incorporate any changes in the accounting standards and good corporate governance disclosure. 
The mark plan is also flexible to take into account specific circumstances that do not apply to a 
specific company. 
As the mark plan varies between the years in the sample and companies, the disclosure scores 
are standardised by dividing the actual disclosure score by the total number of marks available 
less any not applicable. 
Research on using accounting disclosure scores in regression analysis by Cooke (1998) revealed 
that using the actual disclosure scores may not be desirable as the theoretical correct form of the 
relation between the dependent and independent variable is not known. Cooke (1998) suggests 
three transformations of disclosures scores namely; rank regression procedure, normal scores 
approach and log of the odds ratio. 
The current study uses the rank regression approach as the main transformation of the disclosure 
scores. The remaining two transformations will be performed to ensure that the results of the 
test are robust as discussed in Section 4.5.2. The disclosure scores are transformed by 
calculating the fractional disclosure scores for the sample. The fractional ranks are determined 
by ranking all the disclosure scores in ascending order and then dividing the ranks by the 
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number of observations in the sample. This approach has been used by Botosan (1997), 
Botosan and Plumlee (2001), Richardson and Welker (2001) and Hail (2001). 
Previous research has shown that the disclosure level of a firm is positively correlated with firm 
size, leverage, exchange listing status, audit firm size, average return on equity and the number 
of analyst following the firm (Ahmed, 1995; Botoson, 1997; Hail, 2001; Richardson and 
Welker, 2001). The validity of the disclosure scores will be tested against all the above except 
audit firm size, as the majority of the firms in the sample are audited by one of the big 4 audit 
firms and therefore would not add any predictive value to the model. The number of analysts 
has also been excluded due to unavailability of data. Table 4 shows the results of the regression 
analysis on the disclosure scores. 
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TABLE 4 
Regression of DRANK on Average return on equity, Market Value, Leverage and 
Exchange Listing Status 
DRANK = a + ~IRETURN + ~2LMVAL + ~3LEV + ~4LIST 
Dependent Variable: DRANK 
Method: Least Squares 
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations 
Variable 
LMVAL 
LEV 
RETURN 
LIST 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Diagnostic Tests a 
Mean Independence 
White Heteroskedasticity Test 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM Test 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Normality of residuals 
Coefficient 
0.05769 
0.00309 
0.09586 
0.08620 
-0.45512 
0.46147 
0.32497 
0.31659 
0.23733 
22.70006 
Std. Error t-Statistic 
0.01310 4.40413 
0.00300 1.03095 
0.06625 1.44689 
0.03083 2.79605 
0.20091 -2.26529 
0.04427 10.42493 
F -statistic 
Prob(F -statistic) 
t-Statistic 
Mean -1.60E-12 
Obs*R-squared 10.13343 
Obs*R-squared 1.08002 
Test Statistic 1.95137 
40 
30 
20 
10 
o 
Prob. 
0.00000 
0.30318 
0.14871 
0.00542 
0.02403 
0.00000 
38.80094 
0.00000 
Prob. 
0.18114 
0.58274 
-06 -04 -O? 00 O? 04 06 
Residuals 
a The above diagnostic tests reveal that there is no heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation. The residuals 
appear to be normally distributed as indicated by the residual histogram plot. 
b AR(l) function added to adjust for first order autocorre lation. 
Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital: 72 
_.1. A r~:~~ .. D .. :..I __ .~_ 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Consistent with previous research LMV AL and LIST exhibit a positive and highly significant 
correlation with the disclosure quality. This follows as the quantity and quality of information 
for larger companies should be greater and companies listed on international security exchanges 
are expected to provide a greater level of disclosure. The RETURN variable is also positively 
correlated, however only at the 15% significance level. Only financial leverage does not have a 
significant positive relationship with disclosure levels. Overall, the validity of the disclosure 
scores are supported by the model as shown by a highly significant F-statistic with p=O.OOOOO 
and an adjusted R2 of 31.7%. Therefore the disclosure scores developed by the Excellence in 
Financial Reporting exhibit the expected relationships with dependent variables and are 
therefore valid to use in this study. 
4.2.2. Cost of Equity Capital 
The cost of equity capital was estimated using the residual income model as discussed in 
Section 3.2.4 above. Using the residual income model the implied cost of equity capital is the 
rate that equates the intrinsic value of a firm to the current market price of the firm's share. The 
cost of equity capital is the rate that investors discount future expected residual income to arrive 
at the current market price of the firm's share. 
The estimate for the cost of equity capital is calculated by determining the intrinsic value of the 
firm and setting this equal to the share price. The intrinsic value of the firm is estimated to be 
the sum of the current book value of equity and the present value of the residual income. In 
estimating the intrinsic value of the firm, a three-stage approach was used as follows: 
Stage I: The explicit earnings forecast for the two following years, obtained from Reuters 
were used to estimate the residual income. The third year of earning forecast was 
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determined by multiplying the second year earnings forecast by the long term 
growth rate obtained from McGregor BFA. 
Stage 2: The residual income for the next nine years was determined by deriving the 
earning forecasts by linearly fading the return on equity after year three to the 
average market return. The average return on the ALSI for the past 5 years was 
used as a measure for the market return. 
Stage 3: A terminal value was calculated by assuming the residual income in year 12 in 
perpetuity . 
A valid measure of the cost of equity capital is expected to be increasing with risk as measured 
by market beta and financial leverage and also increasing with the size of the firm (Botosan, 
1997; Ross, Westerfield, Jordan and Firer, 1996). In order to determine whether the estimated 
cost of equity capital is valid, the cost of equity capital was regressed against these variables. 
Table 5 below details the results from the regression analysis. 
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TABLE 5 
Regression ofCOE on Beta, Market Value and Leverage 
Dependent Variable: COE 
Method: Least Squares 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
Variable 
BETA 
LMVAL 
LEV 
000 
DOl 
002 
003 
a. 
AR(I)b 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. ofregression 
Sum squared resid 
Diagnostic Tests a 
Mean Independence 
White Heteroskedasticity Test 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM Test 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Normality of residuals 
Coefficient 
0.112357 
-0.69512 
0.054115 
2.833089 
2.26913 
4.60533 
3.128644 
16.82257 
0.492814 
0.486072 
0.47528 
1.95789 
1460.5 
Std. Error t-Statistic 
0.389976 0.288113 
0.112579 -6.17455 
0.02539 2.131363 
0.263898 10.73554 
0.296416 7.655219 
0.315583 14.59308 
0.295301 10.59476 
1.731833 9.713734 
0.045043 10.94099 
F -statistic 
Prob(F -statistic) 
t-Statistic 
Mean 2.64E-12 
Obs*R-squared 12.40244 
Obs*R-squared 1.204964 
Test Statistic 2.037177 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Residuals 
Prob. 
0.77340 
0.00000 
0.03370 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00000 
45.04354 
0.00000 
Prob. 
0.259025 
0.547451 
6 
a The above diagnostic tests reveal that there is no heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation. The residuals 
appear to be normally distributed as indicated by the residual histogram plot 
b ARC I) function added to adjust for first order autocorrelation. 
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The above regression analysis shows that COE is positively correlated with beta (systematic 
risk), however this is not statistically significant. This finding is contradictory to finance theory 
as beta reflects a firm's risk and as risk increases, it is expected that the require rate of return 
would increase. The results for the beta coefficient reveal a very high standard error in 
comparison to the t test statistic, which may be indicative of multicollinearity between beta and 
one or more of the other independent variables. As multicollinearity exists the t-statistics for 
beta will be small and the interpretation of the significance of the variable can not be 
determined reliably. Further testing was performed to determine whether the inclusion of beta 
in the model explains more of the variance as indicated by the R-squared factor. The results 
indicated that the inclusion of beta on the model increased the amount of variation explained by 
the model and therefore beta is a significant variable. It must therefore be concluded that beta is 
significant; however the test statistic in the above table can not be reliably interpreted due to the 
existence of multicollinearity. 
The above regression analysis also reveals a negative relationship between COE and the log of 
the market value, which is highly significant (p = 0.00000). Therefore as the size of the firm 
increases the cost of equity capital will decrease. A significant positive relationship (p= 
0.03370) between COE and financial leverage exits. This implies that as the financial leverage 
increases the cost of equity capital increases. Leverage can be used as a proxy for risk, hence as 
the risk increases in a company its cost of equity capital will increase. 
Dummy variables (000, 001, 002 and 003) have been included in the above model for the 
different years of each observation. The base category for the dummy variables is the year 
1999. All the other years have been assigned a dummy variable with a value of I if the year 
corresponds to that dummy variable. For example if the observation is in the year 2003, 003 
will be assigned with value of I and all the other dummy variables are assigned a value of zero. 
The dummy variables were included as the sample contains observations from different years 
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and the market conditions may be very different from year to year. Therefore not including the 
dummy variables may result in the exclusion of an explanatory variable. 
By including the dummy variables in the regression analysis the adjusted R2 value increased 
from 15.4% to 47.528%, thus indicating that more of the variation of COE can be explained. 
The dummy variables all have t-statistic with a probability of p = 0.00000, which is highly 
significant. This indicates that the cost of equity capital for all the years in the sample is 
significantly different from the base year of 1999 and from each other and therefore need to be 
included in the model. 
Overall, the results support the validity of the cost of equity capital. The adjusted R2 of 
47.528% indicates that just below half of the variation in COE is explained by the above 
regression. The next section examines the effect of expanding the model to include the effect of 
disclosure levels. 
4.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESIS ONE 
Hypothesis one is tested by regressing cost of equity capital on fractional disclosure rank, 
market beta, natural log of the market value and financial leverage as defined by the model: 
COE ll = a + ~IBETA + ~2LMVAL + ~3LEV + ~4DRANK ________ Equation 15 
Where: COEit Expected cost of equity capital for firm i in year t 
BETA Market beta for the firm 
LMVAL Natural log of the market value 
LEV Financial leverage 
DRANK Fractional disclosure rank 
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Beta and leverage have been included in the model to account for a firm's systematic and 
financial risk. As both these risks increase it is expected that the cost of equity capital will 
increase to compensate investors for the increased risk. Market value has been included as 
earlier regression analyses show a highly significant relationship with cost of equity capital and 
disclosure levels. It is expected that larger firms produce more information and therefore have 
less risk resulting in a reduced cost of equity capital. 
Equation 15 was regressed on the total sample of 414 observations. The results revealed a 
negative association between cost of equity capital and disclosure levels, however, this was 
highly insignificant (p = 0.99600). The ordinary least squares regression assumptions of no 
autocorrelation and normal residuals were also not met. The regression analysis was 
reperformed adjusting for the autocorrelation and eliminating the cost of equity capital outliers, 
the results are provided in Table 6. 
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TABLE 6 
Regression of COE on Beta, Market Value, Leverage and Fractional Disclosure Rank 
COEit= a + ~IBETA + ~2LMVAL + ~3LEV + ~40RANK + 000 +001+002 + 003 
Dependent Variable: COE 
Method: Least Squares 
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations 
Variable 
DRANK 
BETA 
LMVAL 
LEV 
000 
001 
002 
D03 
a 
AR(l)b 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Diagnostic Tests a 
Mean Independence 
White Heteroskedasticity Test 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM Test 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Normality of residuals 
Coefficient Std. Error 
1.178177 0.624539 
0.445886 0.523226 
-1.104815 0.151920 
0.066776 0.033721 
2.513721 0.377973 
1.748653 0.452850 
4.613765 0.465468 
3.170169 0.409704 
22.77281 2.293895 
0.459571 0.044896 
0.409548 F -statistic 
0.396229 Prob(F-statistic) 
2.656534 
2815.813 
Mean 
Obs*R-squared 
Obs*R-squared 
Test Statistic 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
t-Statistic Prob. 
1.886474 0.0600 
0.852186 0.3946 
-7.272327 0.0000 
1.980286 0.0484 
6.650527 0.0000 
3.861436 0.0001 
9.912092 0.0000 
7.737700 0.0000 
9.927573 0.0000 
10.23629 0.0000 
30.75038 
0.000000 
t-Statistic Prob. 
7.96E-12 
10.32811 0.587200 
0.879336 0.644250 
2.039901 
-10 -5 o 5 10 15 
Residuals 
a The above diagnostic tests reveal that there is no heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation. The residuals 
appear to be normally distributed as indicated by the residual histogram plot 
b AR( 1) function added to adjust for first order autocorrelation. 
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The coefficients for BETA and LEV exhibit the expected positive relationship with the cost of 
equity capital. Leverage is significant at the 4.84% level thereby suggesting that there is a 
relationship between financial risk and the cost of equity capital for the South African market. 
Beta is however not significant and therefore no conclusions can be reached that beta influences 
the cost of equity capital in the model. The results for the beta coefficient reveal a very high 
standard error in comparison to the t test statistic, which may be indicative of multicollinearity 
between beta and one or more of the other independent variables. As multicollinearity exists 
the t-statistics for beta will be smalI and the interpretation of the significance of the variable can 
not be determined reliably. Further testing was performed to determine whether the inclusion of 
beta in the model explains more of the variance as indicated by the R-squared factor. The 
results indicated that the inclusion of beta on the model increased the amount of variation 
explained by the model and therefore beta is a significant variable. It must therefore be 
concluded that beta is significant; however the test statistic in the above table can not be reliably 
interpreted due to the existence of multicollinearity. 
Log of the market value is highly significant (p = 0.00000) with the cost of equity capital. This 
implies that as the size of a firm increases more information will be available and thereby 
reducing the risk of the firm resulting in the cost of equity capital decreasing. 
The fractional rank of disclosure quality, as measured by DRANK, shows evidence of a positive 
relationship with the cost of equity capital, which is not statistically significant (p = 0.06). This 
result is inconsistent with the hypothesised negative relationship and previous research. The 
robustness of this relationship is tested in Section 4.5, which investigates various sensitivity 
testing. 
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Overall, the model of the cost of equity capital is valid as indicated by the F-statistic of 
30.75038 with a probability of p = 0.00000. The model is therefore highly statistically 
significant with 39.62% of the variance of the cost of equity capital explained in the model. 
Dummy variables are included in the above model for the year of each observation, as with the 
validity testing for the cost of equity capital. By including the dummy variables the explained 
variation of the cost of equity capital, as measured by R2, increased from 19.82% to 39.62%. 
The coefficients of all the dummy variables are highly significant, indicating that the cost of 
equity capital for each year in the sample is significantly different to the base year 1999. 
The regression analysis was reperformed with the base year changing each time, to establish 
exactly which years are significantly different from each other. The following Table 7 details 
the regression analyses and the interpretation of the coefficients of the dummy variables with 
respect to the cost of equity capital. 
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TABLE 7 
Year of Observation Dummy Variable Regression Coefficients a 
DUMMY VARIABLE 
BASE YEAR D99 DOO DOl D02 D03 
1999 N/A 2.513721 1.748653 4.613765 3.170169 
p-value (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Change in CaE [2.513721] [-0.765068] [2.865112] [-1.443596] 
2000 -2.513721 N/A -0.765068 2.100043 0.656448 
p-value (0.0000) (0.0309) (0.0000) (0.1049) 
Change in CaE [-2.513721] [-0.765068] [2.865111] [-1.443595] 
2001 -1.748653 0.765068 N/A 2.865112 1.421516 
p-value (0.0001) (0.0309) (0.0000) (0.0004) 
Change in CaE [-2.513721] [2.513721] [2.865112] [ -1.443596] 
2002 -4.613765 -2.100043 -2.865112 N/A -1.443596 
p-value (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Change in CaE [-2.513722] [2.513722] [-0.765069] [ -1.443596] 
2003 -3.170169 -0.656448 -1.421516 1.443596 N/A 
p-value (0.0000) (0.1049) (0.0004) (0.0000) 
Change in CaE [-2.513721] [2.513721] [-0.765068] [2.865112] 
a p-va1ues for two-tailed test of statistical significance are provided in parentheses. 
The regression results in Table 7 reveal that all years are statistically significantly different from 
each other, except for the years 2000 and 2003 which is only significant at the 10.49% level. 
The coefficients reveal that on average the cost of equity capital is 2.5137% greater in 2000 than 
1999; 0.7651% less in 2001 than 2000; 2.8651% greater in 2002 than 2001 and 1.4436% less in 
2003 than 2002. To quantify the cumulative effect from One year to another the individual 
changes in COE need to be added. For example the change in COE from year 1999 to 2003 
would be an increase of3.1702% (2.513721 -0.765068 + 2.865112 - 1.443596). 
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4.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESIS TWO 
Hypothesis two is tested by regressing cost of equity capital on fractional performance review 
rank, fractional financial disclosure rank, fractional forward looking rank, fractional 
presentation disclosure rank market beta, natural log of the market value and financial leverage 
as defined by the model: 
P6FLRANK + P7PRESENRANK _____________ Equation 16 
Where: COE JI 
BETA 
LMVAL 
LEV 
PERRANK 
FDRANK 
FLRANK 
PRESENRANK 
Expected cost of equity capital for firm i in year t 
Market beta for the firm 
Natural log of the market value 
Financial leverage 
Fractional performance review rank 
Fractional financial disclosure rank 
Fractional forward looking rank 
Fractional presentation rank 
Categories of the 
total disclosure score 
Hypothesis two explores the relationship between the cost of equity capital and the four 
categories that comprise the total disclosure score. Category one, Performance Review, 
includes disclosure relating to the performance of the company including any corporate 
governance disclosure. The Financial Disclosure category focuses on good accounting and 
clear and understandable reporting. The third category, forward-looking information, gives 
credit for forecasts that have been evaluated against the risks of the company, information 
regarding financial and other risks, indicators of long-term financial targets and industry and 
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market-related information. The final category, Presentation, focuses on layout, graphics and 
the readability of the annual financial statements. 
Equation 16 was regressed on the total sample of 414 observations. The results revealed a 
negative association between cost of equity capital and financial disclosure and forward looking 
disclosure scores however, this was highly insignificant (p = 0.9686 and p = 0.2939 
respectively). The ordinary least squares regression assumptions of no autocorrelation and 
normal residuals were also not met. The regression analysis was reperformed adjusting for the 
autocorrelation and eliminating the cost of equity estimate outliers, the results are provided in 
Table 8. 
The model reveals the predicted positive relationship with beta, however this is not statistically 
significant. This is the same result as for hypothesis one and the test for validity of the cost of 
equity capital. The hypothesised negative correlation with market value and positive correlation 
with leverage are both significant with p = 0.00000 and p = 0.04750 respectively. 
The relationship between the cost of equity capital and each of the four categories of the 
disclosure score is expected to be an inverse relationship. The results reveal a negative 
relationship for the financial disclosure scores, however this is not statistically significant with p 
= 0.4816. The association for the other three categories show a statistically insignificant 
positive relationship with cost of equity capital. As none of the predicted relationships are 
significant, no inferences can be made about the relationship between disclosure levels and the 
cost of equity capital. 
As with hypothesis one, dummy variables have been included to represent the different years of 
observation. The results of the regression analysis reveal that the only years which are not 
statistically different from each other are years 2000 and 2001 and years 2000 and 2003. 
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TABLE 8 
Regression of COE on Beta, Market Value, Leverage and the Four Categories of the Total 
Disclosure Score 
COEit= a + ~IBETA + ~2LMVAL + ~3LEV + ~4PERRANK + ~5FDRANK + 
~6FLRANK + ~7PRESENRANK +DOO + DOl + D02 + D03 
Dependent Variable: COE 
Method: Least Squares 
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations 
Variable 
PER RANK 
FD RANK 
FWD RANK 
PRES RANK 
BETA 
LN MV 
LEV 
000 
DOl 
002 
003 
a 
AR(I)b 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Diagnostic Tests a 
Mean Independence 
White Heteroskedasticity Test 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM Test 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Normality ofresiduals 
Coefficient 
0.87593 
-0.41750 
0.32446 
0.88316 
0.25458 
-0.8450 I 
0.05257 
2.75779 
2.22268 
4.83848 
3.35169 
18.15911 
0.5070 I 
0.49415 
0.47821 
2.02645 
1564.57600 
Std. Error 
0.66844 
0.59267 
0.60621 
0.62931 
0.40678 
0.12632 
0.02644 
0.27418 
0.38428 
0.42192 
0.35168 
1.86614 
0.04477 
F -statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
Mean 
Obs*R-squared 
Obs*R-squared 
Test Statistic 
t-Statistic 
1.31041 
-0.70444 
0.53524 
1.40338 
0.62584 
-6.68965 
1.98815 
10.05838 
5.78396 
11.46786 
9.53058 
9.73086 
11.32561 
t-Statistic 
-1.58E-II 
23.23209 
1.10607 
2.040179 
50-r-------------, 
40 
30 
20 
to 
o 
-6 -4 -2 o 2 6 
Residuals 
Prob. 
0.19080 
0.48160 
0.59280 
0.16130 
0.53180 
0.00000 
0.04750 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00000 
31.01513 
0.00000 
Prob. 
0.181828 
0.575202 
a The above diagnostic tests reveal that there is no heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation. The residuals 
appear to be normally distributed as indicated by the residual histogram plot 
b AR( I) function added to adjust for first order autocorrelation. 
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4.5. ALTERNATIVE TESTING 
This section details various alternative tests that are carried out to ensure that the results 
obtained from hypothesis one and two are robust. 
4.5.1. Simultaneity Problem 
A simultaneity problem may exist when assessing the relationship between the cost of equity 
capital and disclosure levels. A simultaneity problem exists as when a firm considers what 
disclosure to provide, all the costs and benefits are taken into account. One of these costs is the 
cost of equity capital. In turn this study is hypothesising that the cost of equity capital is 
determined by the disclosure the firm provides. Therefore a circular cause and effect 
relationship may exist. 
A two stage least squares regression analysis is applied to overcome the suggested problem. 
The first step is to regress the disclosure rank according to the following equation, which was 
used to test the validity of the disclosure scores: 
DRANK(x) = a + ~,RETURN + ~2LMVAL + ~3LEV + ~4LIST ______ Equation 17 
The second step is to determine a predicted disclosure rank for each firm using the regression 
equation determined above. The predicted disclosure rank is then substituted into the main 
equation and regressed. The results from the regressing Equation 18 are presented in Table 9: 
_______ Equation 18 
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TABLE 9 
Two-Stage Regression of COE on Beta, Market Value, Leverage and Predicted Fractional 
Disclosure Rank 
First Stage: DRANK(x) = a + ~IRETURN + ~2LMVAL + ~3LEV + ~4LIST 
Second Stage: COEit = a + ~IBETA + ~2LMVAL + ~3LEV + ~4DRANK(x) 
Stage 1: 
Dependent Variable: DRANK 
Method: Least Squares 
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations 
Predicted regression equation DRANK(x) = a + (0.1 I 6441)RETURN + (0.064363)LMVAL + 
(0.002991 )LEV + (0.091453 )LIST 
Stage 2: 
Dependent Variable: COE 
Method: Least Squares 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
Variable 
DRANK(x) 
BETA 
LMVAL 
LEV 
000 
001 
002 
003 
A 
AR(l)b 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E.ofregression 
Sum squared resid 
Diagnostic Tests a 
Mean Independence 
White Heteroskedasticity Test 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM Test 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Normality of residuals 
Coefficient 
0.93748 
0.23223 
-0.69531 
0.05389 
2.66567 
2.04206 
4.53836 
3.16167 
16.39173 
0.47047 
0.46347 
0.45079 
2.02568 
1563.38800 
Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
0.83249 1.12612 0.26080 
0.40304 0.57619 0.56480 
0.11733 -5.92618 0.00000 
0.02605 2.06888 0.03920 
0.28185 9.45766 0.00000 
0.33139 6.16208 0.00000 
0.34608 13.11368 0.00000 
0.30742 10.28439 0.00000 
1.78147 9.20123 0.00000 
0.04578 10.27680 0.00000 
F -statistic 36.56833 
Prob(F -statistic) 0.00000 
t-Statistic Prob. 
Mean 5.54E-12 
Obs * R -squared 17.24443 0.140632 
Obs*R-squared 1.033166 0.596555 
Test Statistic 2.03932 
80 
60 
40 
20 
Residuals 
a The above diagnostic tests reveal that there is no heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation. The residuals 
appear to be normally distributed as indicated by the residual histogram plot 
b AR( 1) function added to adjust for first order autocorrelation. 
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The first stage of the 2-stage regression was performed with the fractional disclosure rank as the 
dependent variable. The predicted disclosure scores were then determined from the predicted 
regression equation. The predicted disclosure scores were then substituted into Hypothesis One, 
in place of the original disclosure scores. The results indicate that the expected relationships 
hold for beta, market value and leverage, with market value and leverage being statistically 
significant. The predicted relationship between the disclosure level and the cost of equity 
capital is not in accordance with the forecasted negative association. This positive relationship 
exhibited in the model is however not statistically significant (p = 0.26080) and therefore no 
conclusion can be made of the effect of disclosure on the cost of equity capital. 
4.5.2. Alternative Disclosure Score Measures 
Four alternative measures are used instead of the fractional disclosure ranks to test the 
robustness of the original regression analysis. The first is the actual disclosure scores provided 
by the Excellence in Financial Reporting survey. The actual disclosure scores have been 
standardised as a percentage of the total available as this can change year on year. 
The second alternative proxy for financial disclosure level is the overall disclosure ratings 
disclosed in the annual Excellence in Financial Reporting survey. There are five categories in 
which companies may be classified, which are: top ten, excellent, good, adequate and poor in 
this order. The highest category, top ten, is given value of 5 and decreased to the lowest 
category, poor, with a value of 1. 
Thirdly, the normal scores transformation method is applied to the disclosure scores. This 
method is an extension of the original ranking of the disclosure scores. The ranked disclosure 
scores are substituted by the corresponding value in the normal distribution. 
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The final alternative disclosure measure uses the log of the odds ratio method. The disclosure 
scores are transformed by taking the log of the disclosure scores divided by I less the disclosure 
score. This approach will ensure that the range of transformed disclosure scores follows the 
normal distribution. 
Table 10 below summarises the results of the alternative disclosure measures. The regression 
analyses all reflect a positive relationship between disclosure levels and the cost of equity 
capital, however only the disclosure category measure was highly significant. This may be 
misleading as companies within each category are not ranked in order of merit. 
The regressIOn analyses were also performed for the four disclosure categories. Using the 
standardised scores an insignificant positive relationship is shown for the performance, financial 
disclosure and forward looking categories, while an insignificant negative relationship is shown 
for the presentation category. The normal scores revealed an insignificant negative relationship 
for both financial disclosure and forward looking information and an insignificant positive 
relationship for both performance and presentation disclosure scores. Using the log of the odds 
ratio as a proxy for disclosure scores an insignificant negative correlation was found for the 
performance and presentation categories, while an insignificant positive relationship was found 
for financial disclosure and forward looking categories. 
The above alternative tests for different measures of the disclosure scores have all yielded the 
same statistically insignificant result as the original multiple regression of hypothesis one. As 
the results of all these tests are statistically insignificant, no conclusion can be reached regarding 
the relationship between the cost of equity capital and disclosure levels. 
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TABLE 10 
Alternative disclosure measures a 
COEit = a + ~I BET A + ~2LMV AL + ~3LEV + ~4DISC 
Variable STD Disc Disc Categories Normal Log of Odds 
Scores Scores Ratio 
DISC 0.032164 0.51181 0.067784 0.785805 
(0.066/) (00092) (0.4422) (00455) 
BETA -0.14582 -0.10221 0.221322 -0.136856 
(0.8300) (08807) (05823) (0.8397) 
LMvAL -1.05143 -1.10727 -0.692457 -1.061770 
(0.0000) (00000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LEV 0.053677 0.04570 0.060794 0.053252 
(0.2050) (02833) (0.0211) (0.2082) 
000 2.860468 3.18449 2.760342 2.837314 
(0.0000) (00000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
001 1.761911 2.30323 2.200432 1.727808 
(0.0042) (00000) (0.0000) (0.0046) 
002 4.715429 5.24868 4.722667 4.678657 
(0.0000) (00000) (00000) (0.0000) 
003 3.543536 3.84290 3.201977 3.520887 
(0.0000) (00000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
a 21.60155 22.15637 16.72468 23.39764 
(0.0000) (00000) (00000) (0.0000) 
AR(I)b 0.379615 0.38335 0.488026 0.382786 
(0.0000) (00000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
a p-va1ues for two-tailed test of statistical significance are provided in parentheses. 
b AR(l) function added to adjust for first order autocorrelation. 
4.5.3. Use of Fractional Ranks for all variables 
The fractional ranks of all the other variables being: the cost of equity capital, beta, market 
value and leverage are regressed. This is considered as in the original regression all the 
variables are cardinal variables except for the disclosure score, which is ranked. Table 11 
depicts the results of the ranked regression. 
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TABLE 11 
Ranked Regression Analysis a 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
DRANK 0.10543 2.08516 
RANK-BETA -0.00592 -0.12185 
RANK-LMVAL -0.29363 -5.91489 
RANK-LEV 0.08527 1.82483 
000 0.28486 9.34295 
001 0.16508 4.48962 
002 0.43368 11.51465 
003 0.31114 9.32339 
a 0.30282 6.39175 
AR(I)b 0.44501 9.87749 
R-squared 0.49415 F -statistic 
Adjusted R-squared 0.47821 Prob(F -statistic) 
S.E. of regression 2.02645 
Sum squared resid 1564.57600 
a The diagnostic tests for the above regression reveal that there is no heteroscedasticity or 
autocorre lation. 
b AR(I) function added to adjust for first order autocorrelation. 
Prob. 
0.03770 
0.90310 
0.00000 
0.06880 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.00000 
31.01513 
0.00000 
The ranked regression analysis reveals a significant positive association between the cost of 
equity capital and the financial disclosure levels. The ranked regression was reperformed using 
the four components of the disclosure score indicating a negative correlation with the financial 
disclosure and a positive correlation with performance disclosure, forward looking disclosure 
and presentation disclosure, however neither are statistically significant. 
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4.5.4. Regression analysis for each year 
For each year in the sample, hypothesis one and two are regressed separately to determine if a 
different estimated relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity capital is exhibited. 
Table 12 below details the findings of both hypothesis one and two. 
TABLE 12 
Regression Analysis for each year" 
COEit = a + P1BET A + P2LMV AL + P3LEV + P4DRANK 
Panel A: Total Disclosure Score 
Variable 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
DRANK 2.719811 2.664993 0.765775 -2.930410 -1.134648 
(00133) (0018-1) (0-1689) (00354) (0.2892) 
BETA -0.734268 0.900007 0.932832 1.660210 -0.167518 
(04767) (03672) (01903) (0.1970) (0.8412) 
LMvAL -1.212750 -1.133008 -0.405606 -0.403727 -0.539049 
(0.000 I) (()OOOl) (0 08-10) (0 1583) (0.0-156) 
LEV -0.021483 -0.029434 0.014666 0.079370 0.144535 
(06920) (0.607-1) (07128) (0 1487) (0.0164) 
a 25.32990 24.82958 13.39928 17.84452 18.11573 
(0.0000) (00000) (00001) (00000) (0.0000) 
Panel B: Four Disclosure Categories 
Variable 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
PER RANK 0.480617 -1.944580 0.080569 -1.520306 3.332067 
(0.7762) (02547) (0.9523) (04775) (0.0682) 
FD RANK 1.348067 2.845525 0.673416 -1.092639 -2.138737 
(04386) (0.140-1) (06238) (05842) (OIll4) 
FWD RANK -0.874202 3.599745 -1.444831 -2.025183 -0.875965 
(0.5911) (00525) (03137) (02503) (05406) 
PRES RANK 2.413928 -0.497369 1.239502 2.761610 -2.541727 
(0.2020) (O7671) (03299) (01-126) (02020) 
BETA -0.632552 0.961429 0.831736 1.357121 -0.277004 
(05366) (03357) (02634) (02610) (07411) 
LMvAL -1.052644 -1.209640 -0.318109 -0.378522 -0.473392 
(0.0004) (0000 I) (02142) (0 1483) (0.0839) 
LEV -0.023525 -0.021419 0.012148 0.082012 0.131332 
(0 664-1) (070-12) (0 7636) (00978) (0.0295) 
a 22.15865 25.90993 12.27955 16.74127 17.59895 
(00000) (00000) (00011) (00000) (0.0000) 
a p-values for two-tailed test of statistical significance are provided in parentheses. 
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For the years 1999 to 2001 a direct association is found between the cost of equity capital and 
disclosure levels, with a significant association for the years 1999 and 2000. In contrast to this 
an inverse association is found for the years 2002 to 2003, however this is only significant for 
the year 2002. 
One possible reason for this result may be due to the increase in awareness and disclosure levels 
in the South African market in recent years. One possible reason for the increased emphasis of 
annual financial disclosure would be that the JSE has established a monitoring panel in 2002, 
which investigates any deviations from Statements of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice. 
With the introduction of King II in 2002 South African companies have also started to 
disclosure more valuable corporate governance information which has given more valuable 
insight into the respective company. In more recent years the Statements of Generally Accepted 
Accounting Practice have been improved due to an improvements project and the harmonisation 
of the accounting statements internationally, which has lead to the disclosure of the fair of assets 
and liabilities reflecting a more accurate financial position. 
The effect of the four disclosure categories displayed a variation is associations throughout the 
years, with no significant estimated relationship. A greater number of negative associations for 
the years 2002 and 2003 were experienced. 
The results of this alternative test therefore appear to indicate that there is a change in the 
predicted relationship between the level of disclosure and the cost of equity capital from the 
year 2002. 
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4.5.5. Regression Analysis according to Company Year End 
The companIes included in the sample all have different year ends. A sensitivity test IS 
performed to determine whether the timing of the year end would affect the hypothesised 
relationship. Companies with year ends in March, June, September and December were 
included in this analysis. All months with less than 20 observations were excluded as it was 
assumed that the residuals of the regression analysis for these months would not be normally 
distributed. Results in Table 13 reveal that for the months of March, June and September a 
positive correlation is found with the cost of equity capital, but this is not statistically 
significant. For the month of December a negative correlation is estimated, however this is also 
not significant. Therefore by taking the various year ends into account no conclusion can be 
reached of the relationship between the cost of equity capital and disclosure levels. 
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TABLE 13 
Regression Analysis per company year end a 
COEit= a + ~IBETA + ~2LMVAL + ~3LEV + ~4DRANK 
Variable March June September December 
DRANK 0.98962 1.58093 1.57821 -0.24391 
(037170) (010160) (013220) (0.88990) 
BETA -0.19390 -0.55028 3.86973 -0.24440 
(0.84330) (0.45300) (0.00000) (0.86920) 
LMVAL -1.01396 -0.57270 -1.60767 -0.83259 
(000040) (002140) (0.00000) (0.02540) 
LEV 0.04788 0.02748 0.35430 0.23069 
(023970) (081520) (000220) (004020) 
000 2.77239 2.32682 1.76116 1.68145 
(000000) (000030) (0.01-170) (014170) 
001 1.67965 1.09211 1.52981 0.61250 
(0.04760) (0 12160) (004930) (0.60560) 
002 5.39352 2.93326 5.20934 3.23124 
(0.00000) (000010) (0.00000) (0.00780) 
003 3.50720 1.46920 3.48149 3.18409 
(000000) (003040) (0.00010) (001230) 
a 22.02086 15.75746 26.57413 20.20216 
(000000) (000000) (000000) (0.00020) 
AR(l )b 0.45649 0.24200 0.44270 
(000000) (000970) (000030) 
a p-values for two-tailed test of statistical significance are provided in parentheses. 
b ARC I) function added to adjust for first order autocorrelation. 
4.5.6. Regression Analysis according to Industry Sector 
The firms included in the sample also come from different industry sectors and this sensitivity 
test explored whether there is a different relationship estimated for the different industries. The 
different industry sectors were classified into three main categories namely; financial, industrial 
and mining. Table 14 depicts the results from the sensitivity test, which indicate that financial 
and mining firms do not display a significant association for disclosure levels. Alternatively, 
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industrial firms are estimated to have a significant positive association of disclosure levels with 
cost of equity capital. 
TABLE 14 
Regression Analysis per industry sector a 
COEit= a + ~lBETA + ~2LMVAL + ~3LEV + ~4DRANK 
Panel A: Total Disclosure Score 
Variable Financial Industrial Mining 
DRANK 1.13844 2.09136 0.30362 
(0.27660) (0.00020) (0.84970) 
BETA 0.80321 0.28416 0.78455 
(040190) (0.53830) (0.58620) 
LMvAL -1.17029 -1.16214 -0.67524 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.06230) 
LEV 0.03468 -0.02695 -0.22355 
(0.32710) (046560) (065090) 
000 3.06104 2.08203 3.08785 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (000410) 
001 2.32743 1.33553 1.72776 
(0.00160) (0.00140) (0.15780) 
002 5.83035 3.89216 3.14383 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.01220) 
003 5.12520 2.73881 0.70469 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.51720) 
a 23.40436 23.19696 16.55874 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (000220) 
AR(l)b 0.50291 0.47073 0.40871 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00220) 
a p-values for two-tailed test of statistical significance are provided in parentheses. 
b AR(1) function added to adjust for first order autocorrelation. 
4.5.7. CAPM Estimate of the Cost of Equity Capital 
The final alternative test uses the CAPM as a different estimate for the cost if equity capital. 
The cost of equity capital is defined as the risk free rate plus beta multiplied by the market risk 
premium. The model used the 91 day Treasury Bill rate as a proxy for the risk free rate in the 
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South African market and an average long term market risk premium of 8.47%, as found by 
previous research. The original hypothesis one and two were then estimated using the new 
estimate for the cost of equity capital. The results of the revised regression analysis are 
presented for both the total disclosure score and the four categories of disclosure. 
TABLE1S 
CAPM Regression Analysis 
COEit= a + ~IBETA + ~2LMVAL + ~3LEV + ~4DRANK 
Panel A: Total Disclosure Score 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DRANK 0.00256 0.00175 1.46687 0.14320 
BETA 0.08702 0.00151 57.59180 0.00000 
LMVAL -0.00022 0.00044 -0.49419 0.62140 
LEV 0.00001 0.00008 0.13174 0.89530 
a 0.10269 0.00641 16.00977 0.00000 
Panel B: Four Disclosure Categories 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
PER RANK -0.00328 0.00285 -1.15074 0.25050 
FD RANK 0.00586 0.00208 2.81476 0.00510 
FWD RANK -0.00343 0.00280 -1.22545 0.22110 
PRES RANK 0.00502 0.00295 l.70249 0.08940 
BETA 0.08737 0.00155 56.51787 0.00000 
LMVAL -0.00008 0.00045 -0.16653 0.86780 
LEV 0.00001 0.00007 0.18493 0.85340 
a 0.09937 0.00655 15.17129 0.00000 
AR(l)b 
-0.51259 0.04681 -10.95164 0.00000 
b ARC I) function added to adjust for first order autocorrelation. 
The total disclosure level reveals a positive insignificant correlation with the dependent 
variable, COE. When looking at the individual disclosure categories the performance and 
forward looking disclosure categories exhibit a negative correlation, yet these are not significant 
and no inferences can be made on the general relationship. A positive insignificant association 
is estimated for the presentation category and a significant positive association for the financial 
disclosure category. 
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4.6. SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The following table summarises the findings for all the tests, indicating whether a positive or 
negative relationship was found. Taking all the results into account the overall conclusion is 
that there is no significant relationship between the level of disclosure and the cost of equity 
capital for the top 100 companies on the JSE Securities exchange for the years 1999 to 2003. 
TABLE 16 
Summary of COE Regression Analyses Results 
COEit= a + ~IBETA + ~2LMVAL + ~3LEV + ~4DRANK 
Variable Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 
Performance Financial Forward Presentation Disclosure Looking 
Main Hypothesis Pos Pos Neg Pos Pos 
Alternative Tests 
Two-stage regression Pos 
Absolute Disclosure Scores Pos 
Disclosure Categories Pos 
Normal Scores Pos 
Log of odds ratio Pos 
Rank regression Pos Pos Neg Pos Pos 
Observation Years 
1999 Pos Pos Pos Neg Pos 
2000 Pos Neg Pos Pos Neg 
2001 Pos Pos Pos Neg Pos 
2002 Neg Neg Neg Neg Pos 
2003 Neg Pos Neg Neg Neg 
Year Ends 
March Pos 
June Pos 
September Pos 
December Neg 
Industry Sectors 
Financial Pos 
Industrial Pos 
Mining Pos 
CAPM model Pos Neg Pos Neg Pos 
OVERALL CONCLUSION No Significant Relationship 
Bold type = Significant relationship found 
The overall conclusions from the above findings are discussed in the following chapter. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
This research investigates the nature and extent of the relationship between the level of 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital in the South African market for the top one hundred 
companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange (JSE) for the years 1999 to 2003. Past 
theoretical research has found a negative relationship between these two variables. South 
African evidence in this study indicates that there is, on balance, no statistical grounds for 
indicating any such association. This conclusion is developed below. 
This study utilised the disclosure scores developed by the Excellence in Financial Reporting 
Survey for the top 100 companies on the JSE Securities Exchange. These disclosure scores 
exhibit the expected positive relationship with average return on equity, firm size, leverage and 
listing status. Therefore the disclosure scores are a valid measure for the differential levels of 
disclosure and are suitable to be included in the study. 
The cost of equity capital was estimated using the residual income approach. These estimates 
are considered to be appropriate as the estimated cost of equity capital exhibited statistically 
significant relationships with beta, firm size and leverage. 
The first hypothesis of a negative relationship between the cost of equity capital and the 
disclosure levels indicate an insignificant positive relationship. This finding contradicts the 
findings of Botosan (1997), Richardson and Welker (2001), Botosan and Plumlee (2001) and 
Hail (2001), who all found a significant negative relationship which supports the hypothesised 
relationship. However, the finding is consistent with previous South African research 
performed by Negash (2001), who concluded that there is neither an increasing nor decreasing 
relationship between the level of disclosure and the bid-ask spread, which is a proxy for the cost 
of capital. This study also found that there is no significant relationship between cost of equity 
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capital and the four individual disclosure scores. This may indicate that South African investors 
and analysts do not consider increased levels of disclosure or the increased quality of 
information provided to reduce the specific risk of a company, which could lead to a decrease in 
the cost of equity capital. 
The results of this study therefore suggest that hypothesis one and two do not hold and that there 
is no association between the level of disclosure and the cost of equity capital. 
In order to establish whether the conclusions reached for hypothesis one and two are robust 
various alternative tests were performed. The two stage regression analysis supports the 
original conclusion of an insignificant positive relationship between the level of disclosure and 
the cost of equity capital. While the alternative tests using a range of different measures for the 
disclosure scores resulted in both significant and insignificant positive relationships. However 
the significant result for the four different disclosure categories must be interpreted with care as 
there are large variances in disclosure levels in each disclosure category and therefore the result 
may not be accurate. Therefore the results from the above alternative tests are therefore not 
conclusive and the insignificant relationship found for hypothesis one in reconfirmed. 
The results of the alternative test which regressed the ranks of all the variables both independent 
and dependant contradicts the finding of hypothesis one as a significant positive relationship is 
found. However when the individual disclosure ranks were investigated no significant 
relationship was found. This reinforces the original conclusion that hypothesis two does not 
hold. 
Analysis of hypothesis one for the different years in the sample, revealed some interesting 
results. For the years 1999 and 2000 a significant positive relationship was established while an 
insignificant positive relationship was found for 200 I. The more current observation years, 
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2002 and 2003, revealed a negative association with a significant negative relationship for the 
2002 year. These findings therefore may indicate that there has been a change in the 
relationship between the cost of equity capital and the level of disclosure thought the sample 
years. 
One possible reason for this change in relationship is due to the increased focus on corporate 
governance disclosure with the introduction of King II in 2002 and greater focus on accounting 
statement compliance with the introduction of the JSE GAAP monitoring panel in 2002. 
The results of this study may therefore indicate that improved corporate governance and 
financial disclosure could reduce the perceived risk of a company. However the results of this 
study are not conclusive as a statistically significant relationship was only found for one 
observation year. This result should be further researched by observing more recent data. 
The results of the analysis for the financial and mining sectors confirmed the original finding of 
no significant relationship between the cost of equity capital and disclosure levels. However the 
industrial sector exhibited a slightly significant positive relationship. Therefore it can be 
concluded that if the company is in the industrial sector it may influence the relationship 
between the cost of equity capital and the disclosure scores. This finding should however be 
further investigated by including more recent data sets. 
Analysing hypothesis one according to different company year ends also concluded that there is 
no significant relationship and therefore it can be concluded that the year end of the companies 
does not have a significant bearing on the results of the tests. 
The results of hypothesis one were also reconfirmed when the CAPM model was used to 
estimate the cost of equity capital as no significant relationship was found. However the results 
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for hypothesis two were inconsistent when using the CAPM estimates. The CAPM model 
resulted in a significant positive relationship for financial disclosure scores. This contradicts the 
hypothesised relationship and should be further investigated. 
Considering all the results from the regression analyses, the overall conclusion for this study is 
that there is no significant relationship, either positive or negative, between the cost of equity 
capital and the disclosure levels for the top 100 companies on the JSE for the years 1999 to 
2003. However, the results from the study have indicated that there is potentially a change in 
the hypothesised relationship in the South African market from 2002 onwards. 
Further areas of research may consist of: 
• Extending the sample to include more recent years. Thereby investigating the result 
found by this study that for 2002 a significant negative association was found. 
• Analysing the relationship between cost of equity capital and disclosure levels per 
industry. This analysis could further investigate the finding that a significant positive 
relationship was found for the industrial sector. 
• Further investigating the significant positive relationship found between the cost of 
equity capital and financial disclosure scores when using the CAPM model to estimate 
the cost of equity capital. 
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